The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

identified, including Iraqi naval protection for oil platforms and the sustainment

funding for MND(SE).”

1227.  The paper provided a work plan entitled ‘Activity to deliver a step‑change in

Basra’.

1228.  In discussion, a member of DOP(I) suggested that the Cabinet Office paper risked

being too optimistic on security prospects, in light of recent JIC Assessments.1150 DOP(I)

agreed that Mr Browne should take the lead in pulling together a strategy for Basra, with

the support of the Cabinet Office and assistance from other departments.

1229.  On 4 July, Mr Browne wrote to Mr Blair updating him on additional projects,

costing £30.7m (but unfunded) over the financial year, to deliver a Better Basra plan

(see Sections 9.5 and 10.2).1151 Those included:

• a “new unit [a Department of Internal Affairs] to clean up the Basra police from

within”, costing around £4m and requiring eight UK police officers;

• on‑the‑spot mentoring of the Basra police and the regional prison managers,

costing £10.3m and requiring an additional 20 police advisers;

• a new unit – the Prosecution Mentoring Unit – to fast‑track corruption, organised

and major crime cases through Basra’s courts;

• more training for judges; and

• witness protection arrangements.

1230.  The overall aim of the projects was to increase the capacity of the Iraqis to deal

with those they detained and so avoid the consequences of detaining large numbers of

people for long periods.

1231.  Mr Browne’s proposals were approved by DOP(I) on 6 July.1152

1232.  Prime Minister Maliki met Mr Browne in London on 25 July.1153 The meeting was

described as “a relatively robust exchange of views” with Prime Minister Maliki stating

that there was little discipline in the ISF in Basra, a lack of co‑ordination between MNF‑I

and the IPS and that problems with the IPS were attributable to coalition failures to

deliver equipment.

1233.  Prime Minister Maliki also stated that arrests by MNF‑I in MND(SE) were harming

national reconciliation and should be halted. Mr Browne countered that “the real lesson

from Northern Ireland was that the terrorists only came to the table once they had

realised they could not win. It was only then that the combination of early releases and

reconciliation became viable tools in the reconciliation process.”

1150  Minutes, 15 June 2006, DOP(I) meeting.

1151  Letter Browne to Blair, 4 July 2006.

1152  Minutes, 6 July 2006, DOP(I) meeting.

1153  Minute Beadle to MA/DCDS(C), 25 July 2006, ‘Secretary of State for Defence Meeting with Prime

Minister Maliki’.

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