The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
419.
Addressing the
question “What would Iraq need?”, the DIS stated:
“Iraq does
not have the fissile
material to make a
weapon. To rebuild its uranium
enrichment
programme would take years and require extensive foreign
procurement,
which would
not be possible with effective sanctions in place. To make a
weapon
quickly,
Iraq would need Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from the ‘black
market’
(eg stolen
from Russia). It would be credible but very difficult for Iraq to
do this. We
have no
good evidence of Iraq ever acquiring any such
material.
“Iraq
cannot make the crucial neutron
initiator for the
device. Iraq needs a nuclear
reactor to
make a key material in the original unfinished design: it has not
had a[n]
operable
reactor since 1991. Iraq would need to develop or buy a completely
new
initiator
system [from abroad]. Even if it acquired [a] system … Iraq would
have to
develop the
theory and practicalities of how to use such a component. Iraq
could
only do
this quickly with outside expertise.
“Iraq’s
goal has been to produce a missile warhead. If it had the
necessary
components
and fissile material, Iraq could complete its former simple
warhead
design
for air
delivery within a
year. However a missile
warhead would
require
a more
sophisticated design concept which would take at least two years
longer.
These
timescales could only be shortened with outside
assistance.”
420.
Addressing
Iraq’s ability to produce an improvised nuclear device (IND), the
DIS
stated
that: “If Iraq could acquire reactor-grade plutonium on the ‘black
market’ it could
assemble a
crude nuclear weapon.” That would be “large and unreliable” and
have to
be
delivered by “unconventional means (eg a lorry)”. There was,
however, “no evidence”
that Iraq
had sought such material.
“(a) Iraq
does not have any nuclear weapons.
(b) Iraq
has much of the design technology for a simple nuclear
weapon.
(c) It
cannot make the fissile material or a neutron initiator for a
weapon.
(d) To
make a nuclear weapon quickly, Iraq would have to acquire fissile
material
and a
weaponised neutron initiator system, together with foreign expert
assistance.
(e) If
Iraq could acquire sufficient low-grade plutonium from power
reactor
fuel it
could make a crude IND, but would need to use risky
unconventional
delivery means.”
90