3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
997.
Sir David
advised Mr Blair that he should suggest a “package deal”
to
President Bush.310
That should
include a deadline in an amended resolution, which
would
“probably have to give us an extra week to ten days”, and an
“accompanying
declaration
(either written or oral)” to meet the Chilean and Mexican need
for
benchmarks
and calling on Saddam Hussein to go into exile if he were unwilling
to
co‑operate
with the UN.
998.
Sir David said
he had told Dr Rice that Mr Blair might travel to Chile
and Mexico
to show we
were taking account of their concerns. That might be followed by a
“carefully
orchestrated”
meeting with President Bush to demonstrate his (President
Bush’s)
willingness
to listen to partners and allies and that he was still, “even at
the eleventh
hour”,
hoping that Saddam Hussein would disarm. Mr Blair and
President Bush might
then
consult President Putin. Even if that did not persuade President
Putin to support
the
resolution, it might ensure a Russian abstention rather than a
veto, leaving President
Chirac
isolated.
999.
Sir David said
he had made it very clear to Dr Rice that the proposals were
his
idea and
that they had not yet been agreed by Mr Blair.
1000.
Mr Rycroft
advised Mr Blair that the key points he should make to
President Bush
were:
•
The second
resolution was “absolutely vital”.
•
The UK
needed “at least nine positive votes and no Russian
veto”.
•
“If the
French veto alone, it would be just about manageable.”
•
The UK
thought Russia intended to veto, but “would be moved”
by
President Bush.
•
Angola,
Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico and Pakistan were “moving in
the
right
direction”; but they were “not in the bag yet”. Mexico and Chile
were
“interested
in more time, a deadline, and benchmarks”.
•
Adding an
ultimatum into the resolution the UK which identified a “set
date
(e.g. 17 or
21 March)” for Iraqi compliance.
•
It was:
“Important that it would take a positive decision by the Security
Council to
decide that
Iraq had taken the required step – so we have the initiative and
lock
on the
process.”
•
The need to
“define some benchmarks to show what we mean by full
co‑operation”.
•
The
“clusters” document provided “ample evidence on non-co-operation”
and
“must” be
used to extract benchmarks on BW, CW and missiles.
310
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 5 March 2003, ‘Iraq Strategy:
Conversation with Condi Rice:
5 March’.
359