12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
190.
The proposal
to deploy 16 Air Assault Brigade was supported by Major
General
David
Richards, the Assistant Chief of the General Staff, who had been
sent to Iraq by
Mr Hoon
and General Sir Michael Walker, CDS, to scope the potential
for a UK role in
191.
The deployment
was also encouraged by Mr Sawers, who emphasised
the
strategic
importance of taking action in the immediate future to avoid
further deterioration
192.
On 23 May,
Mr Peter Watkins, Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary, wrote to
Sir David
Manning to
explain that the MOD advised against the deployment to Baghdad, on
the
basis that
it was “likely to have only a marginal effect” and might divert
effort away from
the South
of Iraq, where the UK was seeking to implement an “exemplary
approach”.156
193.
The Chiefs of
Staff discussed SSR on 29 May, when they considered a
paper
prepared by
the SPG.157
The paper
had been circulated to the FCO and the Cabinet
Office,
though not to DFID, the Home Office or other departments with
responsibility for
wider
security or justice issues.158
194.
The SPG
defined SSR as addressing “all aspects of the security sector
(police,
judiciary,
penal service, border security, intelligence services and armed
forces) as part
of a long
term holistic programme of change”. Although SSR was normally led
by DFID,
with the
MOD, the FCO and the Home Office as stakeholders, for Iraq the IPU
had been
given the
lead “for the development of UK strategy through the Cabinet
Office”.
195.
The SPG
recognised that SSR in Iraq was part of both the security
and
reconstruction
efforts, and defined the SSR goal for Phase IV as:
“To
establish as soon as possible the core elements of a legitimate,
accountable,
sustainable
Security Sector – which safeguards the Rights of Citizens and
provides
adequate
Defence of future Iraqi Sovereignty.”
196.
The paper
concluded with an assessment of the level of UK military
resource
that should
be devoted to that task, commenting that “we may face a requirement
to
provide
additional resources” and that there was “a choice about the degree
of military
involvement”
which would “have implications for both the level [sic] resources
and the
length of
time we are likely to be engaged”.
154
Minute ACGS
to PSO/CDS, 20 May 2003, ‘Op TELIC: ACGS’ Trip to Iraq (17‑21
May 03) – Initial
Findings
and Recommendations’.
155
Minutes, 22
May 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
156
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 23 May 2003, ‘Security in
Baghdad’.
157
Minutes, 29
May 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
158
Minute
Williams to COSSEC, 15 May 2003, ‘Iraq – Security Sector Reform’
attaching Paper [SPG],
15 May
2003, ‘Iraq – Security Sector Reform’.
101