9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
that
Iraq-based extremists played any role in the direction or planning
of the
attacks.
But the war in Iraq may have been a factor in the radicalisation of
the
two attackers …”
131.
Under the
heading “Prospects”, the JIC judged that:
“For the
immediate future AQ-I will continue to focus their attentions on
Iraq: we
judge they
will attempt to intensify operations in the lead up to the
September
Congressional
report in the US. AQ-I will aspire to conduct external operations
–
including
in the UK – if an opportunity arises; we judge, at least in the
short term,
they will
look for AQ core endorsement of any major plans outside of Iraq.
We
judge AQ-I
will be able to resist pressure from the MNF and the Iraqis into
2008.
As the MNF
presence diminishes, AQ-I will seek to regain lost ground,
establishing
firm bases
in Sunni areas and using them increasingly to reinvigorate its
external
attack capabilities.”
132.
On 25 July,
Lieutenant General William Rollo, who had succeeded Lt Gen Lamb
as
SBMR-I,
sent a minute to ACM Stirrup recording his first impressions “after
spending a
month
getting my head round this vast and multi-faceted
operation”.60
133.
Lt Gen Rollo
identified the key challenge as “to convert tactical into
operational and
strategic
success”. The inability of Prime Minister Maliki to pass critical
legislation and
to spend
money in provinces where Government control had been limited both
raised a
“risk of
reversal”.
134.
Lt Gen Rollo
continued:
“The South,
conversely, and in marked contrast to the situation three years
ago,
looks more
problematic. Shia infighting between JAM and Badr, ineffective
and
corrupt
governors, divided loyalties within the ISF, and infiltration/proxy
war by IRGC
[Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps] have all degraded governance and the
GOI’s
view had
changed over the last eight months from disinterest and complacency
…
to concern,
particularly over Basra.”
135.
In relation to
timing of the handover of Basra Palace and subsequently of
transition
to PIC, Lt
Gen Rollo did not detect “untoward concerns”, but observed that “we
need to
have plans
robust enough to cope with whatever events unfold”.
136.
Officials
specialising in the Middle East sent briefing on Iraq for
Mr Brown to No.10
on 26
July.61
The
briefing said that recent reporting suggested that JAM viewed UK
plans
to withdraw
from Basra as a victory and believed that they were on the verge of
taking
control of
Basra. The brief recorded that JAM intended to continue attacks on
Basra Air
Station
until UK forces had completely left Iraq.
60
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 25 July 2007, ‘First Impressions’.
61
Briefing
government officials specialising in the Middle East, 26 July 2007,
‘Further […] Briefing for PM’.
209