The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
345.
In his
conversation with Dr Rice on 9 June, Sir David Manning
reported Mr Blair’s
view.167
He assured
Dr Rice that the UK would give its best resources to the
intelligence
component
of the ISG, but the UK needed access to all the relevant
information.
346.
Sir David
reported that Dr Rice had assured him that she had been asked
to
take action
after Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush on
2 June, and that
responsibility
for WMD had been transferred from Secretary Rumsfeld to
Mr Tenet, who
was to
ensure that the ISG concentrated on two priorities: the search for
WMD and the
search for
Saddam Hussein and his sons. Mr Tenet intended to recruit Dr
David Kay, a
former
inspector, to help shape the WMD effort.
347.
Sir David also
reported that he had told Dr Rice that action on incentives
and
immunities
was “extremely urgent”. The absence of interviews had been a
“major
weakness”
in UNMOVIC’s approach.
348.
Sir David
commented that Mr Blair’s concerns had clearly registered
with
President Bush
and that Sir Richard Dearlove would be in touch with Mr Tenet
“shortly”.
349.
Mr Cannon
informed Sir Richard Dearlove’s Private Office that, in response
to
the US
“shake-up” of oversight of the ISG, Sir David Manning thought that
the “most
appropriate
channel” to follow up Mr Blair’s conversation with President
Bush would be
for Sir
Richard to write to Mr Tenet setting out the UK’s
views.168
Mr Scarlett
agreed.
350.
As the basis
for a letter, Mr Cannon provided a draft, which had been
cleared with
Mr Scarlett,
together with a copy of the FCO paper on incentives to encourage
Iraqi
WMD
personnel to come forward.
351.
The draft
identified six “key priority areas” for the success of the
ISG:
•
a clear
command structure, with clear priorities and an effective flow
of
information;
•
an
intelligence-led campaign with resources put to best use; the UK
had
“some skills
in this area” and was “keen to contribute”;
•
complete
sharing of intelligence generated by the ISG “without restrictions
of
access at
any level”; the UK was “keen to play its full part”;
•
inducements
and immunity; there was “some experience in this area which
…
could be
helpful”;
•
“a sense of
drive and urgency”; and
•
logistic
support.
167
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 9 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
168
Letter
Cannon to PS/C, 10 June 2003, ‘Iraq Survey Group’ attaching
Paper [unattributed], [undated],
‘Iraq
Survey Group’.
490