3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
774.
Asked if
France would have been prepared to vote for a resolution
authorising
force if
the process had been pursued to the point where Dr Blix might
have reported
that the
process was exhausted, Mr Blair replied that in his
judgement:
“… it was
very, very clear … the French, the Germans and the Russians
had
decided
they weren’t going to be in favour of this and there was a
straightforward
division …
I don’t think it would have mattered how much time we had
taken, they
weren’t
going to agree that force should be used.”275
775.
Mr Blair
added that, if the inspectors had uncovered something
“absolutely
dramatic”,
that “might have made a difference” to France’s position, but
“there was by
then a
political divide on this, of a pretty fundamental
nature”.
776.
Mr Blair
told the Inquiry:
“We never
misrepresented the French view. The French view was perfectly
clear.
It wasn’t
that they were against any second resolution. They would perfectly
happily
have agreed
a second resolution provided it meant a third resolution and they
would
have agreed
a third resolution provided it meant a fourth one.
“What they
were not prepared to do in any set of circumstances, never mind ce
soir,
was that
they were not prepared to agree to a resolution with an
ultimatum.”276
777.
Mr Blair
added that the UK was “caught” in a situation where the US was
“quite
rightly”
saying that what France was “prepared to agree” was “basically a
rerun of 1441
except
possibly weaker”; and that was “useless”.
778.
Mr Blair
stated that President Chirac’s view was that inspections were
working and
that was
the route to deal with Saddam Hussein; “we should not deal with him
by force,
whatever
the circumstances”. President Chirac’s “point was not time”, “His
point was if
it has an
ultimatum in it, I don’t want it.”277
Mr Blair
added: “Anything with an ultimatum,
they were
going to veto.”
779.
On the
morning of Monday 17 March, preparations for Cabinet later that
day
and
Parliamentary debates the following day were put in
place.
780.
Mr Straw
wrote to Parliamentary colleagues drawing their attention
to
the
documents being published, the statements issued at the Azores
Summit
the
previous day, and an FCO paper assessing Iraq’s progress in meeting
the
provisions
of resolution 1441.
275
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 125-126.
276
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, page 100.
277
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 100-101.
537