The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
255.
In the context
of securing the UK’s strategic objectives, Sir Kevin told the
Inquiry
that his
concern in his advice to Mr Hoon in December:
“… was the
risk, as one feels in one’s dark moments, that maybe we are not
going
to get any
of these criteria achieved. It wasn’t looking as if Saddam was
going to
back down
and really comply. It wasn’t looking as if the Americans were not
going
to pursue
the military course if compliance failed. There was a clear sense
of
impatience,
I think in Washington.
“The
planning for post-conflict didn’t seem to me to be very robust
…
“So those
concerns were ones which led me to say to … [Mr Hoon] at the
point
when we
were also not going to get our northern option and were moving to
a
southern
one, which seemed to me to be very significant, that this is the
time to
reappraise
and to think hard before going forward. It wasn’t that I was
against going
256.
Asked whether,
by January 2003, it was too late to reappraise the position
because
the UK was
committed politically to the US and military preparations were
going into
high gear,
Sir Kevin replied that he did not “think it was too
late”.87
“… by the
end of 2002, not to have proceeded … without … very strong
reasons,
such as
Saddam … actually meeting the conditions, would have given us a
real
problem
…
“… [H]aving
indicated an intention, with conditions, to work with the United
States
on the
military track, to have gone back on that point would have carried
risks
and doubts.”
258.
In May 2010,
Sir Kevin Tebbit told the Inquiry:
“… by
Christmas 2002/3, I was very concerned that the penalties of
breaking
with the
Americans, even if our conditions were not fully met, were going to
be
259.
Asked about
the penalties, Sir Kevin replied:
“I think
the penalties of having gone so far by that stage on a joint
venture … were
very
awkward … I felt it would be helpful for Ministers to pause around
January in
2002/3,
when we were being presented with a completely different plan, and
when
it wasn’t
clear necessarily that our conditions were going to be met, that
there was
a risk that
the Americans might proceed without a second resolution, which
we
86
Public
hearing, 3 February 2010, pages 35-36.
87
Public
hearing, 3 February 2010, pages 36-37.
88
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, page 11.
422