6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
“UK could
contribute”. In the time available under “current planning”,
“integration
would also
be difficult”.
•
The UK knew
that the US had “been looking at how else land forces
might
be used”,
which raised the issue of “Turkey and the … ‘northern
option’”.
“To maximise
the military prospects of success” that “must be an
essential
part of
your [the US] plan … Indications are that Saddam is
expecting
something to
happen in the North. Why disappoint him and make his
decision process
easier?”
502.
Maj Gen Wilson
added that there would be difficulties “particularly for the
UK”.
•
First, it
would need “active Turkish support and engagement, not
just
acquiescence”,
and there “may be scepticism in UK about whether
active
Turkish
engagement could be delivered”.
•
Second, the
UK “could probably not get there as quickly … as you
might
want us”.
503.
Before the UK
Government could agree to exploring a military
contribution
seriously,
it was likely to need:
“•
a much more
refined mission, with a better understanding of the
effects
required; and
•
a better
understanding of the level of US support that will be
available.”
504.
It could be
possible to achieve “certain military effects in the North …
without
pitched
battles with the Iraqis”, but defeating Iraqi forces on the way to
securing the
northern
oilfields would “probably” require a “heavy Division”, and it was
“doubtful that
that would
be possible” within US timescales. The UK had:
“… thought
about North, but we have now taken our thinking about as far as
it
can go
without more detail from you. What we now need from you is to know
what
you really
want; and most importantly more on what effect you would want us
to
achieve.”
505.
Maj Gen Wilson
offered “three other observations”:
•
Unless
political and legal issues were resolved, it would be “difficult to
even
deliver
basic support”.
•
The UK
Government would “find it easier to engage politically” if the
campaign
was
multi‑national and, if a multi‑national force was considered for
the northern
option,
“that might be a role for the UK‑led Allied Rapid Reaction
Corps”.
Multi‑nationality
brought “complications”, but the use of the ARRC HQ
would
bring
advantages, including that it had “already been focused on the
region for
years”
which could “help save deployment time” and could “achieve the
combat
power for
certain tasks more quickly than a purely UK force”.
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