The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
989.
Mr Blair
proposed refocusing effort onto the security situation and the
political
process. He
emphasised the need for the Iraqi people to take responsibility for
policing
and
security and pointed to Fallujah where this was already happening.
He believed that
if problems
arose there in the future, Iraqi forces would be in the forefront
of the fighting
and the
Coalition would be protected.
990.
The discussion
also covered the political process. Mr Blair emphasised
the
importance
of a genuine transfer of sovereignty and proposed that after the
transfer,
security
decisions should be taken by a National Security Council,
incorporating Iraqi
ministers
and military leaders, commanders of the Multi-National Force and
the UN.
991.
Mr Blair
also proposed timing the creation of the new Iraqi government, the
new
resolution
and setting out the forward strategy so that they happened
together. This
would show
that there was a clear plan and direction.
992.
The following
day, Sir Nigel Sheinwald wrote to Dr Rice, setting out more
detail
of the
sequence of events envisaged by Mr Blair, for
discussion.563
The
timetable he
set out was:
•
By 31 May.
Mr Brahimi announces key members of the Interim
Government.
•
Week of 31
May. Interim Government visits New York to meet the
Security
Council and
Coalition. New resolution adopted.
•
Early June.
First meeting of National Security Council chaired by the Iraqi
Prime
Minister,
as defined in the resolution.
•
Mid-June
(or mid-July). National Conference to appoint Consultative
Assembly.
•
30 June.
End of the Occupation and the CPA.
•
1 July. US
and UK Ambassadors arrive in Iraq.
•
Mid-July or
September. International donor conference.
993.
Sir Nigel
added that to announce this sequence “we would need
Brahimi’s
agreement
and ideally that of new Iraqi PM”. He indicated that the UK had
considered
accelerating
the transfer of sovereignty, as had been suggested by one US
interlocutor,
but
concluded it would be logistically difficult and could give the
impression of panic.
994.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 13 May that there was acceptance of the need for
the
full
transfer of sovereignty to Iraq from the end of
June.564
Iraqis must
exercise their
sovereignty,
even if they decided to “delegate responsibility” in defined
areas.
995.
As violence in
the South worsened, the UK continued to consider the US
request
to send
additional troops.
563
Letter
Sheinwald to Rice, 12 May 2004, [untitled].
564
Cabinet
Conclusions, 13 May 2004.
370