9.3 | July 2004 to May 2005

56. Mr Asquith, FCO Director Iraq, reported on 9 August that Prime Minister Allawi

understood the need to explain the IIG’s strategy on security, “but does not think the

National Security Strategy document fits the bill”.29

57. Prime Minister Allawi had however agreed the need to sort out the details quickly

with the MNF-I. He envisaged “a statement setting out the security strategy in detail –

including with numbers, timelines and objectives for what the government planned to

achieve”, to be issued shortly before the National Conference planned for mid-August.

58. The JIC assessed the recent upsurge of violence in Shia areas on 11 August and

judged that:

“The scale of the violence has not matched the intensity or breadth of the attacks

in April, nor have there been indications of wider public support for al-Sadr and

his militia.”30

59. In Najaf and elsewhere the Mahdi Army was:

“… resisting strongly … and continues to pose a significant threat to Iraqi Interim

Government political and security objectives … [It] has proven, again, to be capable

of generating widespread attacks across central and southern Iraq and reinforcing

vulnerable points when needed.”

60. Although the JIC assessed that violence in Sunni areas presented “the more

enduring challenge”, Shia violence was “providing a serious test of strength” to

Prime Minister Allawi’s Government.

61. The JIC assessed that:

“The position of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, receiving medical treatment in the UK,

is not clear and his absence may have weakened a potential moderating influence

on all sides.”

62. The JIC judged that the exact degree of Iranian involvement in recent events

was unclear, but Iran was providing “encouragement, funding and possibly arms to

the Mahdi Army”.

63. A message from Mr Asquith in Baghdad on 11 August suggested that, although

its instinct was to take decisive military action in Najaf, the IIG had been persuaded to

delay, at least until after the National Conference on 15 August.31 Planning was under

way for military action at a later point.

29 Telegram 107 Baghdad to FCO London, 9 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Security: Prime Minister’s Views’.

30 JIC Assessment, 11 August 2004, ‘Iraq Security: Shia Violence’.

31 Telegram 118 Baghdad to FCO London, 11 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Security and Najaf’.

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