9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
143.
Mr Blair
emphasised the importance of having the UN involved, in order to
engage
IFIs and
bilateral donors, and to “secure our own exit”. Discussions also
covered
whether a
UN resolution, on which both sides were in principle agreed, should
be an
“omnibus”
resolution or cut into smaller slices.
144.
Mr Straw’s
suggestion that a first resolution should pass as – or shortly
after –
the IIA was
established was accepted; it would endorse the new body as
legally
representing
Iraq. Secretary Powell and Mr Straw would start the process in the
relevant
capitals,
before discussions began in New York.
145.
Mr Blair told
the Inquiry:
“… the
issue between the two of us there at Hillsborough was over the
United
Nations’
role, because again America did not want the UN in. We were clear
that the
UN had to
be in, and I got a paper from the Iraq Planning Unit saying in
essence
that Iraq
couldn’t be run by the UN and the UN didn’t want the lead role, but
the
UN had to
have an important role, and this was raised with President Bush
and
“I can’t
say there were things where I was ringing the alarm bell with
President Bush
and he was
not doing anything. On the contrary when I met him and went
through
item by
item the things that had to happen … and again his system was
completely
resistant
to this, to get the UN into Iraq, they did come
in.”72
147.
A public
statement made jointly by President Bush and Mr Blair after
the
Hillsborough
meeting said:
“The United
Nations has a vital role to play in the reconstruction of Iraq … we
plan
to seek the
adoption of new United Nations Security Council Resolutions that
would
affirm
Iraq’s territorial integrity, ensure rapid delivery of humanitarian
relief and
endorse an
appropriate post-conflict administration for Iraq.”73
148.
In the
statement, President Bush and Mr Blair welcomed the appointment by
the
UN
Secretary-General of a Special Adviser for Iraq and stated
that:
“The day
when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly. As early as
possible,
we support
the formation of an Iraqi Interim Authority, a transitional
administration,
run by
Iraqis, until a permanent government is established by the people
of Iraq. The
Interim
Authority will be broad-based and fully representative, with
members from all
Iraq’s
ethnic groups, regions, and diaspora.”
71
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 139-140.
72
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, page 147.
73
Statement
Bush and Blair, 8 April 2003, Joint
statement on future of Iraq.
155