The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
b) CFLCC
has, initially, asked CDS for the UK to initially take
responsibility for two
provinces
of Iraq during Phase IV.”
611.
On that basis,
Mr Hoon was asked to agree that:
“c) UK
forces may exploit further north to take all of the Maysan province
into the
UK Area of
Operations, once al-Amara is secure, allowing GOC 1 Div to begin
the
process of
engaging local leaders in the same way as he has in Basra province
and
allowing
elements of [US] I MEF to be re-allocated to operations in
Baghdad.”
612.
Lt Gen Reith
explained that:
“Given the
current progress UK forces have made in Basra, with work
beginning
to set up
conditions for Phase IV, CJO believes that the time is right to be
able to
release
forces northwards … The US Task Force Tarawa has already
explored
al‑Amara
and found that it had been self-liberated and [is] currently
stable.
“Once this
task is complete, we will wish to begin work to aid reconstruction
of the
region.
Secretary of State should note, that although a final agreement has
not been
made on the
number of provinces that the UK will support during Phase IV,
CFLCC
has already
asked CDS to take responsibility for both Basra and Maysan
provinces.
Whilst the
initial UK AO boundary made operational sense during war-fighting
in
terms of
co-ordination with the US, if the process of reconstruction is to
start, it
makes sense
to include the whole of Maysan province at the earliest
opportunity.
This will
allow locals to become exposed to UK forces, enabling the
necessary
rapport and
trust to be built up …
“Our
assessment of this additional area is that it is relatively quiet
and therefore
should not
add any unmanageable burden on UK forces – the only real
resistance
has been in
al-Kut, further to the north-west. It is on this basis that we wish
to seek
approval to
extend the UK AO as far as the northern Maysan provincial border
in
advance of
any overt Phase IV activity.
“… we may
be asked by the US to extend our Area of Responsibility to
further
provinces
in due course.”
613.
Lt Gen Reith
advised that the UK response to a US request to extend the
UK’s
AOR would
depend on the permissiveness of the areas concerned and the
response
to requests
for additional Coalition members to offer support during
reconstruction.
The issue
was being discussed by the Chiefs of Staff. Further advice would
follow.
614.
Lt Gen Reith
did not address directly the potential risks associated with
expansion
to two
provinces that had been raised during initial discussion of the
extension of the UK
AO in early
March (see Section 6.2). Those risks included the possible
consequences
for other
parts of government.
108