3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
The JIC set
out the scale of Russia’s economic interests in Iraq, including
expected
earnings of
US$2.5bn in 2002 from OFF contracts; contracts to develop Iraq’s
oil and gas
fields; and
a five year trade agreement. Moscow was also concerned about
recovering
outstanding
debt of at least US$8bn.
Iraq used
its economic relationship with Russia to put pressure on Russia,
including to
engage in
illegal trade which the Russian Government had resisted. Iraqi
bribes paid
to Russian
officials, businessmen and politicians and oil industry lobbyists
had helped
“nurture an
influential pro‑Iraqi lobby in Russia”.
Russian
policy was “to hope for
the best and plan for the worst – so far as its
economic
interests are concerned”. Russia
might see the “deals it has
signed with
Iraq as a
card to negotiate some form of compensation should the current
regime
be toppled by
the US”. It was
“hoping to maintain and possibly expand its current
trading
position”.
Russia
wanted “to maintain good relations with the US while at the same
time opposing an
attack on
Iraq”. It was “becoming increasingly irritated by Iraq’s refusal to
allow the return
of UN
inspectors”, which Russia saw as “the best way to avoid a conflict
in Iraq and get
sanctions
lifted”.
265.
In a meeting
on 3 September, Mr Blair told Mr Kofi Annan, the UN
Secretary-
General,
that:
“… Iraq
needed to know that they had to let the inspectors back in and
that, if they
refused,
the US would not ignore it. The President was under pressure not to
go
down the UN
route and it was important that the international community
stood
ready to
support him if he did.”88
266.
Mr Annan
stated that he had been informed earlier in the year that it was
thought
Iraq would
comply and let the inspectors back in.
267.
Dr Rice
telephoned Sir David Manning after the Sedgefield press
conference to
discuss the
arrangements for Mr Blair and President Bush to meet at Camp
David and
develop US
thinking on what the resolution should contain.89
268.
Sir David
Manning told Dr Rice that he had “assumed we would need to
table a
very tough
initial draft that included negotiating fat that could be
conceded”. Some of the
elements
Dr Rice had outlined would be a “tough sell” and “we might
have … to modify
these
demands to get the resolution through”. Sir David said he
would get back to
Dr Rice
“when our experts had thought the issues through”.
88
Letter
Lloyd to McDonald, 3 September 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with
Kofi Annan’.
89
Minute
Manning to PM, 3 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi
Rice’.
141