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10.2  |  Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
PCRU officials were visiting Iraq to explore how civil/military co-ordination could
be improved.
656.  The official commented:
“… it is important to be realistic about what can be achieved and in what timeframe.
The Armed Forces can interpret ‘short-term’ to be 48 hours but for DFID it means
6 months.”
657.  The Inquiry has seen no indications that Mr Brown or Treasury officials replied
to Maj Gen Shirreff.
658.  Maj Gen Shirreff raised his concerns with Mr Blair at the end of December.
UK plans for 2007, and the US surge
659.  Section 9.5 describes President Bush’s decision in late November to deploy
additional US troops to Iraq to conduct a full-scale counter-insurgency campaign in
Baghdad, the UK’s response to that decision, and US concerns over UK plans to draw
down troops in the South.
660.  In preparation for the 7 December meeting of DOP(I), officials prepared a paper on
military plans for southern Iraq in 2007 and a paper on the UK’s objectives and presence
in Basra.
661.  The MOD paper on military plans for southern Iraq reported that Op SINBAD
could create the conditions to achieve PIC in Basra as early as March 2007.375 The
intention was to “re-posture” UK troops from bases in Basra City to BAS at the end
of Op SINBAD. From there, UK forces would perform a “Military Assistance Mission”.
That would lead to a reduction in troop numbers from 7,100 to 4,500 in May 2007, and
possible further reductions later in the year.
662.  The Basra paper, which was produced by the FCO, considered the implications
of that re-posturing and of the continuing security threat to civilian operations.376 The
FCO paper recommended aiming for PIC in Basra at some point between March and
June 2007. The civilian effort would be led from BAS as there was no prospect of being
able to return to the BPC. Although this meant a limit on the number of civilian staff
and tougher conditions, there would be “significant advantages in co-location with the
military – making possible a more cohesive approach”.
663.  The FCO recommended that the main objectives of the civilian effort during 2007
should be to:
help deliver PIC in Basra;
375  Paper MOD, 5 December 2006, ‘UK Military Plans for southern Iraq in 2007’.
376  Paper FCO, 1 December 2006, ‘Basra: Objectives and Presence in 2007’.
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