5 |
Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to
March 2003
•
“in any
event, interpretation of resolution [1441] may be influenced
by
subsequent
Council discussion following further Iraqi
non-compliance”.90
241.
Lord
Goldsmith’s manuscript comments indicated that he had reservations
about
the first
bullet point in Ms Adams’ proposed “lines to take”.91
242.
At Cabinet on
16 January, Mr Blair said that:
“… he
wanted to make the United Nations route work. The inspectors were
doing
their job
inside Iraq and he was optimistic that they would discover weapons
of
mass destruction
and their associated programmes which had been
concealed.
They needed
time to achieve results, including from better co-ordinated
intelligence.
If Iraq was
not complying with the demands of the United Nations, he believed
the …
Security
Council would pass a second resolution.”92
243.
Mr Blair
told his colleagues that evidence from the inspectors would make a
veto of
a second
resolution by other Permanent Members of the Security Council “less
likely”:
“Meanwhile,
British and American forces were being built up in the Gulf. If it
came
to
conflict, it would be important for success to be achieved quickly.
The [military]
build up
was having an effect on the Iraqi regime, with internal support
dwindling for
President
Saddam Hussein … The strategy remained to pursue the United
Nations
course.”
244.
Mr Blair
concluded by telling Cabinet that he would be meeting President
Bush
at the end
of the month to discuss Iraq, after Dr Blix’s report to the
Security Council
on 27 January.
“… he was
aware of anxieties about the possibility of having to diverge from
the
United
Nations path. There was a good prospect of achieving a second
resolution.
Many had
been doubtful about achieving the first resolution; in the event,
the …
Security
Council vote had been unanimous. While sticking with the United
Nations
route we
should not rule out the possibility of military action without a
second
resolution.
Voting decisions in the Security Council could be driven by
domestic
politics,
not the demands of the international situation.”
246.
Mr Straw
added that:
“In his
recent contacts with the Muslim and Arab world, all could see the
benefit of
Saddam
Hussein’s demise. He had utterly rejected the notion that we were
hostile
90
Minute
Adams to Attorney General, 15 January 2003, ‘Cabinet Meeting,
Thursday 16 January: Iraq’.
91
Manuscript
comment Goldsmith on Minute Adams to Attorney General, 15 January
2003, ‘Cabinet
Meeting,
Thursday 16 January: Iraq’.
92
Cabinet
Conclusions, 16 January 2003.
49