10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
starting to
turn down offers of assistance, primarily on cost grounds.
Mr Chakrabarti and
Mr Dinham
reported that their initial feeling was that alternative models now
needed to
be
explored, including:
•
a greater
use of consultants drawn from the Iraqi diaspora;
•
the use of
current or former senior UK civil servants on short visits;
and
•
deployment
of additional DFID advisers to Baghdad and Basra.
421.
Mr Chakrabarti
and Mr Dinham concluded that DFID should produce a
new
Country
Assistance Plan (CAP) for Iraq, setting out its
intentions.
422.
DFID told the
Inquiry that it could not find any evidence of a response
from
Mr Benn
or of any documents relating to a consequent discussion of aid
modalities,
and that
work to produce a new CAP was not taken forward.240
423.
On 10 October,
the Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility
(JCTSR)
produced
its “Conditions for Provincial Transfer”, which set the framework
for MNF-I
to transfer
security responsibility to an Iraqi civilian authority (see Section
9.4).241
The document
set out a series of standards in four areas:
•
the
insurgency threat,
•
ISF
capability,
•
governance
capacity, and
•
residual
support from coalition forces.
424.
General Mike
Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, visited Iraq from 10
to
13 October.242
His report
to Gen Walker, copies of which were sent to senior
military
officers
only, welcomed the US proposal to deploy PRTs as they would address
the
critical
need to build the capacity of the Iraqi Government. The UK would be
expected
to share
“the PRT burden” in the South.
425.
Gen Jackson
agreed with the Red Team’s argument that the insurgency would
only
be defeated
by a co-ordinated effort across all lines of operation, but
cautioned that the
“ink spot”
concept sounded similar to the “seven cities” and “Strategic
Cities” initiatives
which had
floundered in 2004:
“I am
increasingly hearing the same strategic principles (undoubtedly
sound
ones) being
dressed up in different initiatives, but without ever being
implemented
effectively
on the ground. I suspect there are several reasons for this:
certainly
a lack of
resources for non-military LOO [lines of operation], but also,
perhaps,
entrusting
responsibility for delivering these lines of operation to the wrong
type of
240
Email DFID
[junior official] to Iraq Inquiry [junior official], 19 June 2013,
‘Iraq Inquiry New Queries’.
241
International
Mandate Republic of Iraq National Security Council, 10 October
2005, ‘Joint Committee
to Transfer
Security Responsibility’.
242
Minute
Jackson to CDS, 18 October 2005, ‘CGS Visit to Iraq: 10-13 October
05’.
267