The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
the media
might find out and present the arrangements as a symptom of
weakness
in MND(SE).
49.
The senior
official reported that Mr Asquith had commented:
“The
political context for securing GoI and US agreement to this
proposal is
unhelpful.
Maliki’s relationship with Muqtada and JAM is at an all time low
…
Meanwhile,
Tawafuq’s suspension of participation in cabinet threatens the end
to
Maliki’s
government, though this may take time to unravel.
“As for the
US side, they remain convinced we are looking for a quick exit
from
Basra. They
expect us to respect the conditionality required for PIC but will
be likely
to see this
proposal as an attempt by us to create ‘security stability’, for
just enough
time to
justify withdrawal.
“In the
case of Anbar/Sunni tribal engagement, Petraeus wants MORE than
cease-
fires … He
is looking for evidence of a commitment to support the political
process.
Moreover he
would not see the deal with [JAM1] as being analogous to
Anbar,
where the
locals are actively collaborating with the US against the ‘bad
guys’.
He will
be very aware, also, of the risk that the [JAM1] releases will
merely move
out of MND(SE)
AOR [Area of Responsibility] to attack US forces
elsewhere.
“That is
why I will continue to argue for tougher conditions in the proposed
deal
with [JAM1]:
a. The
coalition should additionally make clear that strike operations
will
continue
against JAM where evidence exists that individuals are about
to/
planning to
commit IDF and EFP attacks.
b. We
should be very careful to avoid giving [JAM1] any grounds to expect
the
release of
the ‘red’ detainees as an inevitable part of this deal. We
should
therefore
say that in circumstances in which attacks halt against
coalition
forces
chances of releases obviously significantly improve.”
50.
Lt Gen Lamb
was reported to have said:
“I support
the continuation of an engagement dialogue with [JAM1], with a
view
to
exploring opportunities to reduce the level of violence in Basra,
and indirect
attacks in
particular. The proposal as it stands seeks a level of support from
GOI
and MNF-I
which should not be assumed at this early stage, however;
furthermore
it suggests
a level of commitment to [JAM1] which is unreasonable, I
believe,
given the
uncertainty of [JAM1]’s authority across a most complicated and
multi-
militia
environment … The Iranian influence, interference and control are
cause for
continued
concern; thus a restriction on manoeuvre and strike operations at
tactical,
operational
and strategic levels would be unwelcome at this
stage.”
192