The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The
deployment of the Amphibious Ready Group was “still to be
decided”.
Demand for
logistics and support helicopters “concurrent with Package 3”
would
“detract
from main effort for dubious military effect”.430
1094.
In his
manuscript comments Adm Boyce indicated his agreement with the
first two
comments
above, and wrote “Yes” alongside the request for confirmation that
the UK
should be
involved in early action.431
1095.
The Chiefs of
Staff meeting on 27 November was informed that:
“If the UK
wished to match US timelines and UK political expectations,
Ministerial
approval
for a more forward leaning military posture was
required.”432
1096.
Maj Gen Fry
stated that neither the ARG, which was “an integral part” of the
US
plan, nor
Package 3 could meet US aspirations for a Running Start. PJHQ had
identified
a series of
measures which would allow them to “close towards or match US
timelines”.
1097.
The Chiefs of
Staff invited PJHQ to refine its advice with a view to
seeking
convergence
with US timelines.
1098.
A “Post
Meeting Direction” instructed PJHQ to provide advice “on the
advantages
and
disadvantages of deploying the ARG”, including deploying “manoeuvre
elements”
[Royal
Marines] and the implications for chartered shipping.
1099.
In Adm Boyce’s
absence, the meeting was chaired by ACM Bagnall.
1100.
The MOD
informed No.10 on 29 November that the US political
strategy
remained
unclear but CENTCOM was seeking to reduce the lead time
between
a political
decision and military action.
1101.
A gap was
developing between the readiness of US and UK forces,
which
would need
visible action to address.
1102.
If Turkey
did not agree to UK forces, more political guidance would
be
needed
before the MOD could go far in developing other
options.
1103.
Sir David
Manning wrote to Mr Watkins on 27 November, requesting a note
for
Mr Blair
on the progress of US planning.433
He asked:
“Are our Chiefs of Staff content
with the US
plans and ready to support them?” He also asked how the UK
would
participate
if the northern option was not available.
430
Manuscript
comment [unattributed] to CDS on Minute DCJO(Ops) to COSSEC, 25
November 2002,
‘The UK
Response to a Running Start for Combat Operations –
COA2’.
431
Manuscript
comment CDS on Minute DCJO(Ops) to COSSEC, 25 November 2002, ‘The
UK Response
to a
Running Start for Combat Operations – COA2’.
432
Minutes, 27
November 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
433
Letter
Manning to Watkins, 27 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
340