6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
310.
On
21 January, Lord Bach’s Private Office wrote to AM Stirrup’s
Private Office,
explaining
that Lord Bach would be reviewing the progress of UORs, “with a
view to
highlighting
potential risks and focusing on means of addressing
them”.149
That
was
because,
while Ministers were aware which UORs had been approved, they had
less
visibility
of:
•
how
confident officials remained that equipment could be procured in
the
required
timeframe; and
•
the extent
to which outstanding areas of concern about equipment
capabilities
were
assessed as being “incapable of resolution” in the required
timeframe.
311.
Lord Bach
agreed that the first step was to hold a meeting with key
stakeholders
to take
stock of the position across all packages but he listed areas that
were likely to
be of
particular concern, including desertisation of armoured vehicles,
Combat ID, NBC
capabilities
and clothing and personal equipment. A short paper setting out the
“key
areas of
shortfall or predicted risk” to assist discussions was
requested.
312.
The minutes
from the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 22 January recorded
that
“unhelpful
media coverage had exposed a UOR problem and it was clear that
shortfalls
would mean
that FOC [Full Operating Capability] by some UK troops might not
be
achieved
until 31 March”.150
313.
Adm Boyce
directed that “immediate action” should be taken and for
commands
to be
informed that “urgent action was underway”. That included
addressing “bad press”
equipment
stories and that UORs were to become a standing item on the agenda
for
operational
Chiefs of Staff meetings.
314.
On the same
day, and in light of the brief provided to Gen Walker about
equipment
shortfalls,
ACM Bagnall wrote to Lt Gen Pigott and AM Stirrup about Lord
Bach’s
“I have
confirmed that DCDS(EC) [AM Stirrup] already has work in hand to
respond.
Clearly,
this needs to include an operational assessment of the likely
impact of any
delays to
particular UORs. It may be helpful to categorise UORs as low,
medium,
high and
‘show stopper’ under this heading, and I have asked DCDS(C)
[Lt Gen
Pigott] to
provide the advice. There will also be a need to highlight any
measures
(for example
a lack of camouflage paint) which may have a low operational
impact
but which
would carry a very significant presentational and morale
cost.
“As you are
aware, CDS has asked me to retain oversight of the UOR process,
and
I would
be grateful if your combined response to Min(DP) [Lord Bach] could
be
149
Minute
PS/Min(DP) to MA/DCDS(EC), 21 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC –
UORs’.
150
Minutes,
22 January 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
151
Minute VCDS
to DCDS(C) and DCDS(EC), 22 January 2003, ‘ Iraq: Op TELIC –
UORs’.
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