1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
proscribed
weapons programmes and the continuation of prohibited activities
…
Positive
conclusions on Iraq’s compliance … had to be revised … Analysis of
the
new
material shaped the direction of the Commission’s work including
the emphasis
on:
obtaining verifiable evidence including physical materials or
documents;
investigation
of the successful concealment activities by Iraq; and, the
thorough
verification
of the unilateral destruction events.”
763.
The report
also stated that the Commission had been “obliged to undertake
a
degree of
forensic work which was never intended to be the case”. Iraq’s
“inadequate
disclosures,
unilateral destruction and concealment activities” had made that
task more
difficult
and continued “in many cases” after 1995. The “concerted
obstructions” raised
the
question of Iraq’s motives.
764.
UNSCOM could
not verify Iraq’s claims that it had fulfilled all its
disarmament
obligations,
ceased concealment activities, and had neither proscribed weapons
nor the
means to
make them. Despite Iraq’s denials, the Commission’s “strong view”
was that
documentation
still existed in Iraq; and that its provision was “the best hope
for revealing
the full
picture” on Iraq’s activities.
765.
The “priority
issues” for disarmament identified in June 1998 had focused
on
unaccounted
for weapons and “set aside other aspects such as fully verifying
production
capacities,
research activities”. This approach was based on the view that
“satisfactory
resolution”
of the specific priority issues “would make it easier to conclude
that other
unverified
elements were of lesser substantive importance”.
766.
The report
added, however, that:
“Conversely,
the inability of Iraq to satisfy these issues would point to more
ominous
explanations
for other unverified parts of Iraq’s declarations.”
767.
The report
stated that Iraq had “once considered” mobile production
facilities.
768.
UNSCOM
described Iraq’s declarations as “fraudulent” and “wholly
lacking
credibility”.
Iraq had declared in August 1995 that it had filled 25 Al Hussein
missile
warheads
with BW agents. It also declared that 200 R-400 aerial bombs had
been
produced
for BW purposes but the number filled with agents was a “guess”.
Iraq had
also
pursued aerial drop tanks, aerosol generators and helicopter spray
tanks and there
were
questions about programmes for other munitions.
769.
UNSCOM was
concerned about the uncertainties surrounding the extent
of
weaponisation,
the production of bulk BW agent, imports of raw materials,
organisation
and
planning, research and development, and past and continuing efforts
of deception.
UNSCOM
could report with confidence on the destruction of some facilities,
but it
had “no
confidence that all bulk agents have been destroyed; that no BW
munitions
or weapons
remain in Iraq; and that a BW capability does not still exist in
Iraq.”
167