9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
645.
In his phone
call with President Bush on 2 April, Mr Blair reiterated the
message
that “we
had to go all out for a unity Government”.309
Once it was
formed the key was to
set out a
“coherent programme” in particular on security. It would also be
necessary to
provide
help “on the media side”.
646.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Rice visited Baghdad on 2 April to try to add
momentum to
the
political process.310
647.
The IPU
briefing for the visit advised that the focus should be “squarely
on
government
formation”, with the objective of pushing the Iraqis to agree a
permanent
government.
648.
The British
Embassy Baghdad reported that Mr Straw and Secretary Rice
called on
President
Talabani on 2 April.311
649.
After
acknowledging that President Talabani and other Iraqi leaders were
facing a
difficult
moment, Secretary Rice said that:
“She and
the Foreign Secretary were in Iraq to urge them to finish the job
of forming
the
government quickly. The Iraqi people were becoming impatient and
increasingly
concerned
about stability. The ability of the country to sustain another
event similar
to the
Samarra mosque bombing was questionable. Every day that passed
without
the
formation of a new government increased that risk. Talabani knew
how much
the US
wanted Iraq to succeed. But the patience of the American people was
being
exhausted
and a democratic leader could do little without the support of his
people.
“Key to
making progress was to break the deadlock over agreeing the
Prime
Minister.
The US and UK shared the assessment of others that it was not
going
to be
possible for Ja’afari to secure the position. He did not have the
necessary
cross‑party
support nor the full support of his own Alliance. It was clear that
the
choice of
Prime Minister was one for Iraqis to make. But it was equally clear
that a
decision
needed to be made on this as soon as possible.”
650.
President
Talabani was reported to have welcomed the visit and “asserted
that
most of the
main issues surrounding the structure of the new government had now
been
resolved”.
He agreed that Dr Ja’afari was not the right person to lead
Iraq at that time:
“But
matters needed to proceed step by step if they were to reach a
successful
conclusion.
Perhaps with the help of this visit progress on the Prime
Ministerial
nomination
could be made in a matter of days.”
309
Letter
Phillipson to Hayes, 3 April 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s phonecall with
President Bush, 2 April’.
310
Briefing
FCO, 31 March 2006, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s visit, 2-3 April
2006’.
311
eGram
9200/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 3 April 2006, ‘Iraq: Joint Visit by
US Secretary of State and
the Foreign
Secretary, 2-3 April 2006: Talabani’.
595