The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
770.
On 27
November, The
Observer published an
article on human rights abuses in
Iraq, based
on an interview with Former Prime Minister Ayad
Allawi.721
It quoted
him as
saying:
“The
Ministry of the Interior is at the heart of the matter. I am not
blaming the
Minister
himself, but the rank and file are behind the secret dungeons and
some of
the
executions that are taking place.”
771.
The IPU was
concerned that the investigation would slip in the run‑up to
elections,
and advised
Mr Straw on 2 December to reiterate the importance of its
progress during
a telephone
call with Prime Minister Ja’afari.722
The IPU had
“received indications” that
a
representative on the investigation committee and an Iraqi Minister
were “trying to
whitewash
the report”. Concurrently, the IPU was considering with the US and
the MOD
“the
possibility of taking direct MNF‑I action” in other suspected
locations of abuse.
772.
The IPU raised
concerns about the delay in the investigation again with
Mr Straw
on 7
December.723
A note by a
junior official advised Mr Straw to raise the matter
with
Dr Rice
during their bilateral meeting that day. The note said that no
action had been
taken,
other than two meetings of Deputy Prime Minister Rosch Shaway’s
committee.
773.
As well as
continuing to apply pressure for a report to be delivered, the
official
advised
Mr Straw to suggest “snap inspections” of other locations,
which ideally would
be
Iraqi‑led, but could be led by MNF‑I if necessary.
774.
An eGram sent
from the British Embassy on 17 January 2006 stated that
there
was “still
no sign of any report”.724
Mr Shaway
had spoken to the US on 16 January
and had
blamed the delay on Shia and Badr members appointed to the
Commission by
Prime
Minister Ja’afari and difficulties in working around the election
and local holidays.
He had told
the US that he intended to report in between 10 and 14
days.
775.
The eGram also
stated that:
•
There had
been three unannounced inspections of detention facilities by
joint
Iraqi/MNF‑I
forces. The US/MNF‑I selected the sites but Iraqi officials led
the
investigations.
•
Details had
been provided about two of the inspections, one facility
had
234 detainees
claiming abuse (though mostly from previous facilities and
not
within the
last two months), and the other held 13 detainees and was “of a
fairly
good
standard”.
721
The
Observer, 27
November 2005, Abuse worse
than under Saddam, says Iraqi leader.
722
Minute IPU
[junior official] to Foreign Secretary, 2 December 2005, ‘Iraq:
Secretary of State’s Telephone
Conversation
with Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja’afari’.
723
Minute
Paterson to Foreign Secretary, 7 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary – Secretary Rice
Speaking
Note’.
724
eGram
978/06, Baghdad to FCO, 17 January 2006, ‘Iraq: Detainee Abuse
Update’.
230