13.1 |
Resources
…
•
There are
risks that our taking on military leadership will result in our
being
sucked into
wider responsibilities for reconstruction with even higher
costs.”
173.
Mr Dodds
told the Inquiry why he had written that paper:
“… I think
we had a specific request … from the Chancellor’s Office for a
piece of
advice on
the aftermath and I think what had happened was that it had
become
clear,
quite suddenly really, to the Chancellor … to the Treasury, that
there was
a set of
options being considered for the role that the UK [military] might
play …
174.
Mr Dodds
told the Inquiry that the Treasury’s earlier work had focused on
the major
conflict
phase of operations, using a three‑year planning framework.
However:
“… it
suddenly became clear to us … if we had been wiser, we might have
kind of
anticipated
this, but it was a bit of a surprise … that there were discussions
going on
between
parts of the UK Government and others around the role that the UK
might
play, which
had the potential to see us in Iraq for significantly longer than
we had
been
initially supposing.
“… the
Treasury wasn’t in the loop before early … March, around this
thinking, and
…. when
this thinking emerged, there … appeared to have been an
assumption
on behalf
of some other parts of government that this was another thing where
…
the
Treasury would just sign the cheques … without being involved in
the strategic
decision.”
175.
Mr Brown
also received a paper from a Treasury official on the potential
impact
of all
military and non‑military expenditure in Iraq on public
expenditure.114
The
best
estimate of
the cost of UK military combat operations was £3.1bn.
Maintaining
a
“medium‑term
stabilisation/peace‑keeping force” might cost up to £1bn a year
for
two years.
The official advised that:
“… whilst
the costs of the actual fighting are now pretty inescapable
we
still
have a
window of opportunity to exert some influence over the scale of
this
post‑conflict
commitment.”
176.
The 6 March
meeting is described in detail later in this Section.
177.
The 14 March
meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on Iraq (AHGI)115
was advised
that the
IPU was
considering how best to approach other donors for support on
reconstruction,
113
Public
hearing, 14 July 2010, pages 13‑16.
114
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chancellor, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq ‑
Potential Public Spending Impact’.
115
From 20
September 2002, the Ad Hoc Group on Iraq (AHGI) co‑ordinated all
non‑military
cross‑government
work on post‑conflict issues.
471