9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
268.
Mr Blair
concluded that providing forces in support of the Fallujah
operation meant
that the UK
would maintain an influence on its planning.
269.
Mr Hoon
announced the deployment to Parliament that
afternoon.135
In
his
statement
he said:
“We cannot
consider the current UK area of responsibility in isolation. What
goes
on in the
rest of Iraq affects southern Iraq and affects UK troops wherever
they are
based. We
must therefore consider our contribution in the context of the
overall
security
situation right across Iraq. This means that an armoured battle
group
consisting
of the 1st
Battalion
the Black Watch and supporting units will deploy
to an area
within Multi-National Force (West) to relieve a US unit for other
tasks.
They will
be deploying with the necessary combat support services such
as
signallers,
engineers and medics, resulting in a total deployment of around
850
personnel.
This deployment will be for a very limited and specified period of
time,
lasting
weeks rather than months.”
270.
In a telephone
call on 22 October, Prime Minister Allawi told Mr Blair that he
was
“pursuing a
fresh political initiative on Fallujah and would exhaust the
peaceful options
before
considering military action”.136
271.
The decision
on whether to commence military operations rested with
Prime
Minister
Allawi, who was assured by the British Embassy Baghdad that “HMG
would
back [his]
judgement”.137
272.
Towards the
end of October, UK officials in Baghdad reported that Prime
Minister
Allawi was
showing “early signs of a wobble on timing” for the
election.138
273.
Mr Blair’s
Private Secretary briefed him that he should “put down a firm
marker”
on this
subject when speaking to Prime Minister Allawi.139
274.
On 23 October,
Prime Minister Allawi agreed that the necessary ISF troops
could
be moved
into place for the Fallujah operation.140
In
parallel, he continued to pursue
275.
Of the Iraqi
forces identified to deploy in Fallujah, Major General Andrew
Farquhar
(the
British Deputy Commanding General of Operations in the
Multi-National Corps –
135
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 21
October 2004, columns 1035-1037.
136
Letter
Quarrey to Wilson, 22 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Allawi,
22
October’.
137
Telegram
303 Baghdad to FCO London, 24 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Fallujah Meeting
with Allawi,
24
October’.
138
Minute
Heatly to Prime Minister, 22 October 2004, ‘Your telephone call
with Allawi’.
139
Minute
Quarrey to Prime Minister, 22 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Allawi Phone
Call’.
140
Telegram
302 Baghdad to FCO London, 24 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Fallujah:
Meeting with Allawi
23
October’.
141
Telegram
303 Baghdad to FCO London, 24 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Fallujah Meeting
with Allawi,
24
October’.
439