The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
501.
Sir David
concluded that it was “impossible to be certain” that the strategy
would
work, “but
it gives us a chance. The odds are against a successful second
resolution
at the
end of February … an extra couple of weeks could make the
difference.”
502.
Sir David
advised “saying nothing” until after the European Council,
allowing
France a
little more time, then hitting them with the draft resolution
“probably
in
mid-week”. Before that, Mr Blair would “need to do a heavy
selling job” with
President Bush.
503.
Mr Blair
agreed the proposals were worth exploring and asked for
advice,
particularly
on the proposed “tests” for Iraq’s compliance.
504.
Mr Blair
agreed that the ideas in Sir David Manning’s advice of 16 February
were
worth
exploring.133
That is
addressed later in this Section.
505.
Mr Straw
was told that President Bush believed Mr Blair would
commit
troops if
the US took unilateral action.
506.
Mr Straw
discussed developments with Secretary Powell twice on 16
February.
507.
In the first
conversation at 1pm, Mr Straw set out his “emerging
thinking”,
including
the suggestion that a meeting might be held on 14 March at which
Dr Blix
and
Dr ElBaradei would be asked to report if Iraq was “actively
and fully co-operating,
perhaps
against a checklist”.134
Mr Straw
added that he thought that Dr Blix:
“… would
try to avoid responsibility for this. But whilst a further material
breach and
what we did
about it were matters for the Security Council, saying whether
Iraq
was or was
not co-operating had initially to be a matter for the inspectors
since
the
information … was theirs. After all, it was Blix’s statement …
about further
co‑operation
… on process which had put us on the back foot.”
508.
In a
discussion about the content of any checklist, Mr Straw said
that it was
important
it:
“… did not
become a ‘tick in the box for compliance’, but rather good evidence
of
compliance
and it had to be very comprehensive, so that if he [Saddam Hussein]
did
all these
things he was complying in reality.”
509.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Powell agreed that if Saddam Hussein was faced with
a
choice, for
example, of whether to destroy missile engines and the survival of
his regime,
he would
choose the latter. Mr Straw added that:
“… since
the objective of HMG’s policy was … the disarmament of Iraq’s WMD
if
possible by
peaceful means, clear and continuing evidence of Saddam’s
compliance
133
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 17 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Way
Forward’.
134
Letter
Straw to Manning, 17 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Telephone Conversation
with Colin Powell,
16 February’.
270