The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
some text
describing our approach to reconciliation in the context of
developments
in South
East Iraq accordingly. In the meantime we will continue to avoid
comment
on specific
cases, confirm that we have been and continue to be, engaged
in
dialogue
with all relevant parties in our area, that this is in line with
and supports
Iraqi
Government initiatives and that individual detainee releases occur
only when
they are no
longer judged to be an imperative threat to security.
“In all
this, we need to be particularly mindful of the families of UK
personnel killed,
either
potentially as a result of the activities of those currently
interned or in the
course of
capturing them …
“Having
reviewed the position, we believe that we should now routinely
provide
parallel
notification to the families involved when detainees potentially
linked to the
death of UK
service personnel leave the UK detention facility either being
transferred
to Iraqi
control or being released.”
359.
Mr Browne’s
office replied on 13 September to confirm that he had noted
the
imminent
release and that further advice would be put forward shortly on the
long-term
sustainability
of the operation.182
Mr Browne
was reported to be “particularly keen that
any further
releases are in the context of a strategy for a more enduring
political/security
solution
for the South.” Presentational advice was also agreed, including
the intention to
inform
bereaved families.
360.
Senior
officials discussed Mr Day’s note of 11 September to Ms Aldred
at the Iraq
Strategy
Group on 13 September, and concluded that further work would be
needed
before
NSID(OD) considered the options in early October.183
The Group
identified a
need for
“inter-departmental discussion of the political and military
objectives for the
UK’s
continuing engagement in Iraq”. The Group also identified the need
for discussion
with the US
about enabling support and their own plans, and the need for work
on the
location of
a future UK military and civilian presence.
361.
Mr McDonald
also told the Group that Mr Brown would make a short
statement
the
following day, confirming the UK’s commitment to Iraq. He still
intended to make a
substantive
statement when Parliament returned, which would focus on PIC in
Basra.
By this
stage, ideally a date would have been agreed and announced. While
he did not
favour
artificial timetables and remained committed to a conditions-based
approach to
PIC,
Mr Brown wanted to say as much as possible about the tasks and
numbers of UK
troops that
would be required after PIC and give an indication of roughly when
each
phase of
overwatch would be reached.
362.
Lt Gen Wall
noted that there would need to be some engagement with the
US
on the
substance before Mr Brown made his statement: current US
military thinking
182
Minute
McNeil to PJHQ J9 Hd Pol/Ops 1, 13 September 2007, ‘Op. TELIC:
discussions with JAM’.
183
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 13 September 2007,
‘Iraq Strategy Group,
13 September’.
252