12.1  |  Security Sector Reform

290.  The paper reiterated that the existing strategy was to have 70,000 Iraqi police in

place by mid‑2004 and a 40,000‑strong Iraqi Army in place within a year. It stated that

the UK’s target was to have deployed 100 police trainers by the end of 2003, out of a

planned CPA total of 600.

291.  The paper reiterated that the “training of the police should be accelerated and

given a proper strategy (without which potential international contributors will not come

forward)” but did not give details of how this might happen. The IPU considered that the

key principles for what could be achieved were:

• The Coalition should work through existing local leadership and customs and

Iraqis must take increasing security responsibility.

• Intelligence on the threats should be improved.

• De‑Ba’athification principles should be applied flexibly.

• Key programmes should be accelerated and made more effective, including

by bringing police and army reform under a single head and providing more

resources.

• Coalition Forces should be released for counter‑terrorism tasks by giving basic

security tasks to Iraqi forces.

292.  In conclusion, the paper stated:

“While we develop Iraqi capability and broaden the international security presence,

we must keep threats under control. This means more Coalition Forces are needed

in the short term …”

293.  There was no proposal for where this resource should come from, nor was

there an assessment of whether it was realistic to train 70,000 police officers within a

three‑month period as suggested by Mr Blair.

294.  Another briefing paper, produced by Mr David Richmond,259 stated that although

Ambassador Bremer agreed with the importance of accelerating recruitment he did not:

“… think that a target of 70,000 within the next three months is achievable. The

cost would be huge and, however successful we were in speeding up training, the

overwhelming majority of new recruits would end up with no training at all. This

would be counter‑productive.”260

259  Mr David Richmond was temporarily the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Iraq. In September

2003 (on the arrival of Sir Jeremy Greenstock), Mr Richmond became the Deputy.

260  Telegram 150 IraqRep to FCO London, 4 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing for Prime Minister’.

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