9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
38.
Sir John
Sawers told the Inquiry that Mr Vieira de Mello had identified
that, as
well as an
interim administration, there might be a need for some form of
transitional
government,
because a new Constitution would take time to
prepare.15
Iraqi
politicians
were
concerned that the Constitution “should not be something that
emanated from the
United
States and Britain; it should be something that they created
themselves”.
39.
Sir John also
told the Inquiry that it had been agreed by early June that a
Political
Council,
“an advisory body but with real powers”, was
required.16
This needed
to
be
“genuinely accepted by the Iraqis” as representative. Over 100
individuals were
considered
for membership. Party leaders were told that they should not
delegate
membership
to their subordinates.
40.
Sir John
assessed that the UK had “quite a lot of influence” on the
selection of
members, on
which Ambassador Bremer was happy for him to take a leading
role.17
This was
an area in which he thought that he personally and the British
political team
added value
because:
“I was able
to work with both Bremer and de Mello in a way which was
probably
closer at a
personal level than they were able to work with one
another.”18
41.
On 2 June,
Mr Blair sent a personal Note to President
Bush.19
42.
Sir David
Manning provided copies to Mr Straw, Mr Hoon,
Mr Hoon’s Private
Secretary
and Mr Jonathan Powell (Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff) but
instructed “It must not
go
wider”.
43.
In his Note,
Mr Blair wrote that:
“I met
Jerry Bremer and others in Iraq. He is very impressive, got a real
grip and is
doing a
great job. But the task is absolutely awesome and I’m not at all
sure we’re
geared for
it. This is worse than re-building a country from
scratch.
“We start
from a really backward position. In time, it can be sorted. But
time counts
against us
…
“My sense
is: we’re going to get there but not quickly enough. And if it
falls apart,
everything
falls apart in the region.”
44.
Mr Blair
suggested that:
•
security in
Baghdad had to be dealt with at once and police training was
vital
and
urgent;
15
Public
hearing, 10 December 2009, pages 91-92.
16
Public
hearing, 10 December 2009, pages 92-93.
17
Public
hearing, 10 December 2009, page 95.
18
Public
hearing, 10 December 2009, page 97.
19
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 2 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Note’
attaching Note [Blair to Bush],
[undated],
‘Note’.
213