12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1382.
In July 2007,
the UK presence at the PJCC comprised 100 military personnel
and
seven
police advisers.1270
1383.
On 7 June,
Maj Gen Shaw reported:
“The
increased attacks on the PJCC have exposed a known vulnerability,
and
disproved
the hope that co‑location with IPS would provide some protection
…
[W]e are
reinforcing its sustainment whilst we are there, and reviewing its
viability
in the
longer term, particularly when Basra Palace is
vacated.”1271
1384.
The minutes of
the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 12 June recorded that a
DOP
paper on
the timing of leaving Basra Palace was being delayed until 12 July
to allow
time for
further advice on whether UK personnel could remain in the PJCC
after it was
vacated.1272
The MOD
assessment was that the advantages of remaining
outweighed
the
disadvantages.
1385.
On 13 June,
Maj Gen Shaw reported that MND(SE) was keeping the PJCC
issue
under
constant review: “The situation is fluid and I would wish to retain
the freedom of
decision
for as long as possible. My intent remains to retain it for as long
as practicable,
and we are
well aware of the message sent if/when we leave
it.”1273
1386.
On 20 June,
the PJCC was attacked by indirect fire (IDF), fatally
wounding
Major Paul
Harding.1274
The junior
official briefing Mr Browne on the incident wrote
that the
PJCC had been subject to a number of attacks over the last month,
including
from Rocket
Propelled Grenades and IDF. Although a number of personnel had
been
wounded in
those attacks, this was the first UK fatality.
1387.
The official
wrote that, because of the attacks, the PJCC was subject to
regular
security
reviews. A mortar locating radar had recently been installed as a
result. The
medical
team in place (one Emergency Trauma Nurse and three combat
medical
technicians)
was more than would ordinarily be allocated to a deployment of the
PJCC’s
size, but
had been deemed necessary because of the increased threat to the
site.
1388.
AM Stirrup
visited Iraq from 1 to 3 July.1275
His visit
report stated that he had
been
advised by Maj Gen Shaw that there was “little military
advantage” in retaining a
presence at
either the PJCC or Basra Palace, other than for “retaining a base
for strike
operations
and some situational awareness”. Maj Gen Shaw advocated
relocating to
Basra Air
Station at the “earliest practicable point”. Maj Gen Shaw
was “confident” that
the
conditions set for PIC had been met.
1270
Paper FCO
& MOD, 12 July 2007, ‘Iraq: Transition in Basra’.
1271
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 7 June 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 07
June 2007’.
1272
Minutes, 12
June 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
1273
Minute,
Shaw to CJO, 13 June 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –
13 June 2007’.
1274
Minute PJHQ
[junior official] to APS/SofS [MOD], 20 June 2007, ‘Iraq:
Op Telic: Death of a British
Soldier’;
GOV.UK,
21 June
2007, Major Paul
Harding 4th Battalion The Rifles killed in Iraq.
1275
Minute Kyd
to PS/SofS [MOD], 5 July 2007, ‘CDS Visit to Iraq 1‑3 Jul
07’.
377