3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
•
Everyone
accepted that Saddam Hussein was not co-operating fully with
the
United
Nations: “[N]ot a single person … in Europe; not a single person in
the
rest of the
world – believes that he is co-operating either fully or
unconditionally,
and
certainly not immediately.”
295.
Mr Charles
Kennedy, Leader of the Liberal Democrats, asked if the
Attorney
General had
advised that a war in Iraq would be legal in the absence of a
second
resolution
authorising force; Mr Richard Shepherd (Conservative) asked
why a UN
resolution
was required; and Mr John Randall (Conservative) asked if
Mr Blair would
publish the
legal advice.
296.
In response,
the points made by Mr Blair included:
•
As he had
“said on many occasions … we … would not do anything that did
not
have a
proper legal basis”.
•
Resolution
1441 provided the legal basis and the second resolution was
“highly
desirable
to demonstrate the will of the international
community”.
•
It was not
the convention to publish legal advice but it was “the convention
to
state
clearly that we have a legal base for whatever action we take, and
… we
must have
such a base”.
297.
In response to
a question from Mr Kennedy about whether Mr Annan had
said that
action
without a second resolution would breach the UN Charter,
Mr Blair stated that
Mr Annan
had said that it was “important that the UN comes together”.
Mr Blair added
that it
was:
“…
complicated to get that agreement … when one nation is saying that
whatever
the circumstances
it will veto a resolution.”
298.
Mr Alan
Howarth (Conservative) asked whether Mr Blair agreed
that:
•
divisions
in the international community only gave “comfort and opportunity
to
Saddam
Hussein”;
•
that “a
deadline receding into the summer haze was not a serious
interpretation
of ‘serious
consequences’” as the Security Council had unanimously agreed
in
November
2002; and
•
given
Saddam Hussein’s motive and capacity to equip terrorists with
chemical
and
biological weapons, there was an urgent necessity to disarm him
whether
there was a
second resolution or not.
299.
Mr Blair
replied that Mr Howarth had set out “precisely why we need to
take
action”.
Leaving troops in the region “for months on an indefinite time
scale, without
insisting
that Saddam disarms, would send not only a message of weakness …
to
Saddam, but
a message of weakness throughout the world”.
451