9.5  |  June 2006 to 27 June 2007

would see Prime Minister Maliki co‑ordinating policy with the three‑person Presidency,

and a more effective division of responsibilities at the heart of government. Mr Asquith

commented that the UK should seek to encourage former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi

to support the deal and to work constructively with Prime Minister Maliki.

808.  DOP(I) met on 10 May, chaired by Mrs Beckett.439 Four papers were provided for

the meeting:

• Mr Browne’s letter to Mr Blair of 5 May, setting out his views on reconciliation.440

• A minute from Mrs Beckett to Mr Browne following her attendance at the Sharm

el‑Sheikh meeting, containing her views on reconciliation.441

• Two very similar papers produced jointly by the FCO and MOD entitled ‘Iraq:

After UNSCR 1723’ and ‘Iraq: MNF‑I Mandate in 2008’ prompted by the

imminent review of resolution 1723.442

809.  In her minute, Mrs Beckett said that the fact that the meetings in Sharm el‑Sheikh

took place was proof that headway was being made on reconciliation.443 But she warned:

“If Sunni Arab governments do not help Maliki to make early progress [on]

reconciliation, I am convinced that they will get what they most fear – an avowedly

pro‑Iranian (ie SCIRI) government in Baghdad.”

810.  In private, she reported that the other participants in the conference had been

downbeat:

“While none disputed the central importance of reconciliation, they were negative

in their assessment of the Government of Iraq’s ability to deliver and guarded about

their own willingness to help.”

811.  The FCO and MOD papers, which considered the mandate for coalition forces

in Iraq, both recommended that the UK should press for a further resolution to extend

authorisation for the MNF to be present in Iraq, to continue to intern individuals for

security reasons and to take “all necessary measures” to implement their mandate.444

812.  The MOD and FCO judged that, despite the fact the Prime Minister Maliki was

under pressure to demonstrate Iraqi sovereignty, he would want coalition troops

to remain into 2008 because of the Sunni insurgency and levels of ISF capability.

Challenges in achieving Security Council agreement were likely to come from the French

and Russians, both of whom had called for a clear timetable for withdrawal.

439  Minutes, 10 May 2007, DOP(I) meeting.

440  Letter Browne to Blair, 5 May 2007, ‘Iraq: Reconciliation’.

441  Minute Beckett to Secretary of State for Defence, 8 May 2007, ‘Iraq: Reconciliation’.

442  Paper Iraq Policy Unit FCO and Joint Commitments MOD, 3 May 2007, ‘Iraq: After UNSCR 1723’;

Paper FCO and MOD, 3 May 2007, ‘Iraq: MNF‑I Mandate in 2008: UK Non‑Paper’.

443  Minute Beckett to Secretary of State for Defence, 8 May 2007, ‘Iraq: Reconciliation’.

444  Paper Iraq Policy Unit FCO and Joint Commitments MOD, 3 May 2007, ‘Iraq: After UNSCR 1723’;

Paper FCO and MOD, 3 May 2007, ‘Iraq: MNF‑I Mandate in 2008: UK Non‑Paper’.

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