6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
699.
That was
not the No.10 understanding of what had been agreed.
700.
In the
context of the many issues which were being addressed
on
23 September
2002,275
the Inquiry
has seen no evidence to indicate that the
difference
of view about what Mr Blair and Mr Hoon had agreed was
anything
other than
a genuine misunderstanding.
701.
Mr Blair
discussed the issues with Mr Hoon on 23
September.276
702.
Following that
meeting, Mr Watkins informed officials in the MOD
that:
“The Prime
Minister is content for us to proceed broadly as set out in my
letter
of
20 September. The Prime Minister remains very cautious about
the viability
of Package
3, not least because of its implications for our ability to meet
other
contingencies
and the significant cost premium entailed. In the light of this,
Mr Hoon
believes
that it is all the more necessary heavily to caveat this
possibility in contacts
with the
US. We should emphasise that it is at the limits of what we could
offer
and that –
because of other potential demands on our Armed Forces
including
FRESCO –
we cannot be sure that we could deliver it. The US must
therefore
examine
carefully how they would plan the campaign in the absence of
such
a contribution.”
703.
The packages
that might be offered to the US were to be conveyed in
terms
cleared
with Mr Hoon’s Private Office.
704.
Mr Blair
had also confirmed that he was content to reallocate units
from
Op FRESCO
and agreed that his statement on 24 September would contain a
reference
to the need
for preparedness.
705.
Mr Watkins
made no reference to any discussion of post‑conflict
issues.
706.
Sir David
Manning’s record of the meeting on 23 September, issued
on
25 September,
stated that Mr Blair had agreed that “we should present
Package 2 as
a potential
contribution at the CENTCOM Planning Conference” and: “We should
not
be shy
about presenting this as a significant and valuable
offer.”277
707.
Sir David
also recorded that Mr Blair had agreed that units for Op
FRESCO
should be
replaced to maintain the possibility of a land force contribution,
with minimum
publicity.
Mr Blair did not, however, want “any suggestion” that the UK
might offer
“a major
land contribution to a Force in northern Iraq. We should not
surface this
possibility
at the [US] Planning conference.”
275
Preparations
for publication of the WMD dossier and Statement/debates in
Parliament on
24
September 2002.
276
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 23 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting with the
Prime Minister:
23
September’.
277
Letter
Manning to Watkins, 25 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Potential UK
Contribution to Any Military Action’.
279