The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“CW had
been destroyed immediately after the war. But there was some doubt
about
whether he
was in a position to know that in the same way that he was in a
position
to know
about the biological programme.
“He also
exposed an organised Iraqi campaign of deception directed from the
top
– so I
think in many ways what he revealed to us very much coloured our
approach
193.
In the
aftermath of Lt Gen Kamil’s departure, Iraq admitted that its
disclosures had
been
“deliberately misleading” and released a large amount of
information which had
both
“confirmed” many of UNSCOM’s earlier observations and “brought to
light earlier
unknown
documents of significance”.89
It included
“new information related to Iraq’s
attempts to
acquire advanced chemical and biological weapons capabilities, as
well
as long-range
missile systems with ranges of up to and over 2,000
kilometres”.
194.
Iraq’s
disclosures “represented a great step forward in the work of the
Commission”
and
expedited the inspection process.90
In December
1995, Mr Ekéus reported to the
Security
Council that Iraq had recently submitted new declarations,
containing “full, final
and
complete disclosures” in relation to its chemical, biological and
missile programmes,
which still
did not meet UNSCOM’s requirements.
195.
During a visit
by Mr Ekéus to Baghdad, the Iraq delegation had also supplied
a
“personal
diary” relating to the destruction of chemical and biological
bombs, which had
been
provided by a junior military engineer, but “the Commission was
convinced that
certain of
the most important documentation had not yet been handed
over”.
196.
UNSCOM
concluded that the documents disclosed by Iraq in August
1995
showed that
Iraq’s chemical weapons programme was more developed and wider
in
scope than
had previously been admitted.91
Iraq had
“used chemical weapons facilities
to support
other weapons of mass destruction programmes”, including
“production of
casings for
radiological bombs, activities for the uranium chemical enrichment
process
and major
support for the biological weapons programme”. They had also
provided
evidence of
“much greater foreign involvement in Iraq’s chemical weapons
programme”.
Production
records had been provided for only seven months in 1988,
not for all
production
including “the most important phase after 1988 when Iraq
conducted
research
and development, inter alia, on more advanced chemical weapons
agents and
delivery systems”.
88
Public
hearing, 25 November 2009, page 45.
89
UN Security
Council, 11 April 1996, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the Special
Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of resolution 687 (1991)’
(S/1996/258).
90
UN Security
Council, 17 December 1995, ‘Tenth Report of the Executive
Chairman of the Special
Commissions
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of resolution 687
(1991)’
(S/1995/1038).
91
UN Security
Council, 11 April 1996, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the Special
Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of resolution 687 (1991)’
(S/1996/258).
58