The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
900.
The MOD
started in spring 2002 from the assumption that if military
action
was
required, the UK should participate; and that its contribution
would be on
a similar
scale to the UK contribution to the US‑led operation Desert Storm,
the
liberation
of Kuwait in 1991. It stressed the importance of making a
contribution
which would
be seen by the US as commensurate with the UK’s capabilities
and
the demands
of the campaign.
901.
In
addition, from the outset of the planning process, the military
leadership
was looking
for a discrete UK role in ground operations. This reflected
their
concerns
about the difficulty of integrating forces from different nations
for
ground
operations.
902.
That led to
the identification of Package 3, which was described as a
UK
division,
although its size, shape and component parts changed
significantly
over time.
903.
From late
July onwards, the need to provide cover for a potential
strike
by the Fire
Brigades Union, which was equivalent to a medium scale
operation,
meant that
the UK would have been unable to deploy a division of either two
or
three
brigades within the timescales envisaged by US military
planning.
904.
Military
planners concentrated on identifying the maximum
practicable
contribution
the UK would be able to generate within the potential timescales
for
US
action.
905.
From August
until December 2002, UK planning was based on providing
a
divisional
headquarters and one armoured brigade for operations in northern
Iraq.
906.
Asked how the
UK’s options had been evaluated, Mr Hoon told the Inquiry that
the
assessment
of the UK’s contribution had been approached “in terms of what
actually
was
achievable”; it had been “assumed that we would want to be helpful
to the United
States …
and, therefore, how would we go about offering as much as was
consistent
with all
the other pressures that we faced”.350
“My sense
was that, generally speaking, the Prime Minister wanted us to be
involved
to the
maximum extent that was possible … The Prime Minister was,
generally
speaking,
anxious to do what the United Kingdom could to
help.”351
350
Public
hearing, 19 January 2010, page 53.
351
Public
hearing, 19 January 2010, page 56.
312