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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
and regulatory framework to encourage investment. We should continue to support
this as the only means of creating a sustainable electricity network in Iraq.”
380.  Mr Quarrey passed the report to Mr Blair, with the comment:
“The conclusion that the only solution is a long-term plan is consistent with
DFID’s approach but fails to address the damage done in the meantime to the
political process.” 221
381.  Lieutenant General Robin Brims, the Senior British Military Representative, Iraq,
reported to Gen Walker on 31 July that “the US with ourselves” were establishing a
“Red Cell” to examine critically counter-insurgency strategy.222
382.  Mr Anderson advised Mr Benn’s Private Secretary on 12 August that, despite
intensive efforts by DFID and MND(SE), Op AMPERE (the US$10m point power
generation project developed by MND(SE) and DFID and approved in March 2005) had
not met its objective of providing additional power during the summer months.223 The
failure had been due primarily to inexperienced suppliers, poor security and a lack of
access. Six of the planned 10 generators had now been commissioned; work continued
to commission the remaining four.
383.  The Red Team reported on 31 August.224 Section 9.4 describes the report and the
UK’s response in detail.
384.  The Red Team assessed that the coalition’s current strategy – based on
transitioning security responsibilities to the Iraqi Government – would enable coalition
forces to disengage from Iraq but would leave Iraqi Security Forces that would not be
able to defeat the insurgency in the foreseeable future.
385.  The Red Team proposed an alternative strategy, based on what it described
as the “classic ‘ink spot’ counter-insurgency model”, which sought to create success
in small areas and then steadily expand outwards until the areas flowed together
to form larger regions of security.225 Military operations were to be more closely
co‑ordinated with “political-economic actions” tailored to the specific needs of local
communities. Action was also needed at the national level, to set the conditions for
the counter-insurgency campaign.
386.  The report proposed that a Joint Inter-Agency Counter-Insurgency Task Force
should be established to plan, co-ordinate and implement governance reform and
economic sector development work in support of the counter-insurgency campaign.
221  Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 29 July 2005, ‘Iraq Update’.
222  Minute Brims to CDS, 31 July 2005, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (172) 31 July 2005’.
223  Minute Anderson to Private Secretary [Benn], 12 August 2005, ‘Iraq Situation Update’ attaching Report
DFID, [undated], ‘Iraq Situation Report: 12 August’.
224  Red Team Report, 31 August 2005, ‘An integrated Counterinsurgency Strategy for Iraq’.
225  Red Team Report, 31 August 2005, ‘An integrated Counterinsurgency Strategy for Iraq’.
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