The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
and
regulatory framework to encourage investment. We should continue to
support
this as the
only means of creating a sustainable electricity network in
Iraq.”
380.
Mr Quarrey
passed the report to Mr Blair, with the comment:
“The
conclusion that the only solution is a long-term plan is consistent
with
DFID’s approach
but fails to address the damage done in the meantime to
the
381.
Lieutenant
General Robin Brims, the Senior British Military Representative,
Iraq,
reported to
Gen Walker on 31 July that “the US with ourselves” were
establishing a
“Red Cell”
to examine critically counter-insurgency strategy.222
382.
Mr Anderson
advised Mr Benn’s Private Secretary on 12 August that,
despite
intensive
efforts by DFID and MND(SE), Op AMPERE (the US$10m point
power
generation
project developed by MND(SE) and DFID and approved in March 2005)
had
not met its
objective of providing additional power during the summer
months.223
The
failure had
been due primarily to inexperienced suppliers, poor security and a
lack of
access. Six
of the planned 10 generators had now been commissioned; work
continued
to
commission the remaining four.
383.
The Red Team
reported on 31 August.224
Section 9.4
describes the report and the
UK’s
response in detail.
384.
The Red Team
assessed that the coalition’s current strategy – based
on
transitioning
security responsibilities to the Iraqi Government – would enable
coalition
forces to
disengage from Iraq but would leave Iraqi Security Forces that
would not be
able to
defeat the insurgency in the foreseeable future.
385.
The Red Team
proposed an alternative strategy, based on what it
described
as
the “classic ‘ink spot’ counter-insurgency model”, which
sought to create success
in small
areas and then steadily expand outwards until the areas flowed
together
to form larger
regions of security.225
Military
operations were to be more closely
co‑ordinated
with “political-economic actions” tailored to the specific needs of
local
communities.
Action was also needed at the national level, to set the conditions
for
the counter-insurgency
campaign.
386.
The report
proposed that a Joint Inter-Agency Counter-Insurgency Task
Force
should be
established to plan, co-ordinate and implement governance reform
and
economic
sector development work in support of the counter-insurgency
campaign.
221
Minute
Quarrey to Prime Minister, 29 July 2005, ‘Iraq
Update’.
222
Minute
Brims to CDS, 31 July 2005, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (172) 31 July
2005’.
223
Minute
Anderson to Private Secretary [Benn], 12 August 2005, ‘Iraq
Situation Update’ attaching Report
DFID,
[undated], ‘Iraq Situation Report: 12 August’.
224
Red Team
Report, 31 August 2005, ‘An integrated Counterinsurgency Strategy
for Iraq’.
225
Red Team
Report, 31 August 2005, ‘An integrated Counterinsurgency Strategy
for Iraq’.
260