The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
be possible
to give a final view on the legal effect of the resolution until it
has been
adopted.
Unless the Council’s intent is crystal clear from the text (which
seems
unlikely),
it will have to be assessed in light of all the circumstances, in
particular any
statements
concerning the effect of the resolution made by Council members at
the
time of its
adoption.”
668.
Mr Blair
asked about the position “if, following a flagrant violation by
Iraq, one
of the
other P5 Members perversely or unreasonably vetoed a second
resolution
intended to
authorise the use of force”. Mr Brummell’s note records that
Lord Goldsmith
replied
that it was “not easy to see how there is room for arguing that a
condition of
reasonableness
can be implied as a precondition for the lawful exercise of a
veto”; but
he agreed
to give the issue further consideration.
669.
Mr Brummell
wrote that it would “be important for the Attorney to be kept
closely
informed of
developments”; and that: “The attitude of other Council members
(and the
wider
international community) in response to any breach by Iraq will
also be critical, i.e.
whether
there is general support within the Council and the wider community
for military
action to
enforce the terms of the 1991 cease‑fire arrangements as amended by
the
new resolution.”
670.
Mr Brummell
concluded by stating that he had been asked “to make clear”
that
Lord
Goldsmith would be “available for a further meeting at any time the
Prime Minister
would find
this helpful”.
671.
Mr Brummell’s
letter was not sent to anyone other than Sir David
Manning.
672.
Mr Brummell’s
letter provoked concern from No.10. In a note for the No.10
file,
Mr Powell
recorded:
“I spoke to
the AG to make it clear that we do not
expect
records of meetings from
other
departments, especially from people not even at the meeting. We
produce
records
should they be needed. Furthermore, this was a commentary on a
draft
UNSCR that
no longer exists.”221
673.
Lord Goldsmith
told the Inquiry that, although the draft resolution he had
discussed
with
Mr Blair on 22 October had, as Mr Powell had pointed out,
been replaced, “none of
these
immediate changes affected the concerns” he had
raised.222
674.
Mr Blair
told the Inquiry:
“… I can’t
remember exactly what I said after 22 October [the meeting with
Lord
Goldsmith],
but I should imagine I said, ‘Well, you [Lord Goldsmith] had better
make
sure it
does meet our objectives.’”223
221
Note
(handwritten) Powell, 25 October 2002, ‘File’.
222
Statement,
4 January 2011, paragraph 3.7.
223
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 55‑56.
318