9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
“We pointed
out that just because we engaged in talks, we did not necessarily
have
to come to
any sort of agreement with JAM, beyond the exchange of detainees
for a
lack of
IDF. But the aim of such talks was to tie JAM into a political
accommodation,
before all
of our detainee chips were played and before we had to release
[JAM1]
himself. We
also commented that we would have little influence over what
happened
in Basra
after PIC. JAM would be a force whether we liked it or not
…”
471.
The official
who was leading on drafting the submission commented after
the
meeting
that:
“Jon
[Day]’s concern (which is shared by SofS) is that we need to be
careful we
are not
seen to be taking sides in the politics of Basra … he would be much
more
comfortable
therefore to focus discussion on the security and development axes
and
leave the
politics to the FCO … after his release.”227
472.
Mr Browne
wrote to Mr Brown on 5 October setting out his proposals for
the UK
military
commitment to Iraq during 2008.228
He reported
that the MOD had agreed a
revised set
of tasks with Gen Petraeus which would be achievable within the
force levels
suggested.
Mr Browne proposed:
•
retaining
current troops levels (4,500 in Basra plus 500 elsewhere)
until
March 2008;
and
•
drawing
down to around 2,500 troops from March 2008, focused on training
and
mentoring
the ISF with “only a limited in
extremis re-intervention
capability”.
473.
Mr Browne
assessed that this deployment would not require significant US
support
in southern
Iraq. The estimate of costs from May 2008 was £650m per year.
Possible
options
beyond November 2008 had not yet been considered.
474.
Lt Gen Rollo
reported on 7 October that Basra continued to attract the attention
of
Prime
Minister Maliki and the MCNS: “in itself an entirely healthy
indication of increasing
acceptance
that Basra is their responsibility”.229
475.
A recent
MOD/MOI delegation to Basra had returned with a list
of
recommendations,
including on the need to “tighten up border and post security and
to
clear
selected areas of the town of militias”.
476.
Lt Gen Rollo
also reported that in the margins of Mr Brown’s visit Gen
Petraeus
had queried
the UK’s long-term intentions in 2009 and had pursued the matter
again
with Lt Gen
Rollo subsequently.
227
Email
PJHQ-J9 DCOMDSEC to PJHQ-CJO-MA, 5 October 2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]’.
228
Letter
Browne to Brown, 5 October 2007, ‘Iraq’.
229
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 7 October 2007, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (273) 7 Oct
07’.
271