The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
821.
Commenting on
how to raise effective forces, Lt Gen Rollo said:
“… the
answer to more forces ultimately was more Iraqis, and the real
trick was
to raise
effective Iraqi forces, and that the way to do that was to take
relatively
small
numbers and to try to instil into them a sense of loyalty to the
state, which
was really
quite difficult to achieve … So loyalties were fragile and depended
on
A US report
from the Independent Commission on the ISF, published on 6
September
2007,
explained that Iraq’s coastline was very small but strategically
significant.777
It included
the al‑Basra and the Khor al‑Amaya oil terminals (responsible for
90 percent
of Iraq’s
revenue) and Iraq’s only deep water port, Umm Qasr. The maritime
borders with
Iran and
Kuwait were contested and not clearly demarcated.
The Iraqi
Navy reported through the Joint Headquarters to the
IMOD.778
A paper
produced by the MOD on 9 December 2009 stated that “the notable
UK
contribution”
during Phase IV was the development of the New Iraqi Navy, led by
the
Royal Navy
at Umm Qasr.779
The Royal
Navy also trained the Iraqi Coast Guard, which
operated in
close proximity to the Iraqi Navy but reported to the
MOI.780
On 1
February 2005, a junior MOD official advised Mr Hoon that 49
personnel were
deployed in
Navy Advisory Support Teams (ASTs), including force
protection.781
The Chief
of the Naval Staff visited Iraq in July and observed that
recruiting and training of
the Marine
force was almost complete and subject to the procurement of
suitable support
vessels
they should be able to resume responsibility for the security of
oil platforms later in
the
year.782
He noted
problems with funding but stated: “our AST and the Iraqi Navy
have
done well …
I am content that we have reached the stage where the AST can start
to
draw down
provided it is adequately supported by MND(SE)”.
In the same
month Lt Gen Brims described the development of the Iraqi Navy
as
“a significant
UK success”.783
822.
At the SSR
meeting on 7 October 2004, it was reported that there were two
senior
prisons
advisers and four prisons mentors in theatre.784
The minutes
recorded that a
776
Public
hearing, 15 December 2009, page 14.
777
Report, 6
September 2007, ‘Independent Commission on the Security Forces in
Iraq’.
778
Report to
Congress, 17 February 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
779
Paper MOD,
9 December 2009, ‘Iraq Security Sector Reform’.
780
Report, 6
September 2007, ‘Independent Commission on the Security Forces in
Iraq’.
781
Minute
Chaudhry to APS/SofS [MOD], 1 February 2005, ‘Manning and
Development of the Iraqi Navy
Advisory
Support Teams’.
782
Minute CNS
to CDS, 28 July 2005, ‘Visit to the Northern Gulf and Iraq 25‑26
Jul 05’.
783
Letter
Naworynsky to Quarrey, 21 July 2005, ‘Update on Progress of Iraqi
Security Forces’.
784
Minutes, 7
October 2004, Security Sector Reform meeting.
242