The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
124.
In January
2007, the divergence between US and UK strategies was thrown
into
sharp
relief by President Bush’s announcement that the US would adopt a
new strategy,
of which a
prominent feature would be the deployment of a surge of US forces,
primarily
to Baghdad
and its environs. UK assessments of the prospects for the new US
policy
were bleak,
reflecting widespread pessimism about the prospects for Iraq. UK
strategy
continued
to look towards withdrawal.
125.
US concerns
about the differences in approach were evident. In February
2007,
Sir David
Manning, British Ambassador to the US, reported that Secretary Rice
had
asked him
“to tell her honestly whether the UK was now making for the exit as
fast
126.
The divergence
in strategies was also illustrated by the conditions-based
process
through
which the four provinces in MND(SE) were transferred to Provincial
Iraqi Control
(PIC)
during 2007. Although each transfer was signed off by senior
members of the US
military,
there was persistent reporting of US concerns about readiness for
PIC, whether
the
conditions had actually been met and the wider impact of
transfer.
127.
The US was
also uncomfortable about arrangements made by the UK with a
militia
group in
Basra which allowed the safe exit of UK troops from their main base
in the city
(see Box
entitled ‘Negotiations with JAM1 in Basra’).
128.
By March 2006,
senior members of the UK military were considering the
possibility
of civil
war in Iraq, prompted by rising levels of sectarian violence and
concerns that the
Iraqi
Government was “not … perceived as even-handed in security
issues”.40
The
risk
of civil
war had been acknowledged by Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja’afari in the
wake of the
bombing of
the al-Askari mosque in February. Although there was general
agreement
that the
situation in Iraq did not constitute civil war, the risk that one
might develop was
considered
to be real.
129.
At this time,
the presence in Iraq of the MNF was authorised by resolution
1637
(2005). The
exchange of letters between Prime Minister Ja’afari and the
President of the
Security
Council which accompanied the resolution clearly identified
providing security
for the
Iraqi people as the reason why a continued MNF presence was
necessary.
130.
In late April,
FCO officials were concerned that security in Basra was declining
and
that a
determined and sustained effort, including a more assertive
military posture, would
be required
to deliver the UK’s objective of transferring Basra to Iraqi
control by late
2006 or
early 2007.
39
Letter
Manning to Hayes, 1 February 2007, ‘Conversation with the US
Secretary of State,
31 January 2007’.
40
Minute
Houghton to CDS, 5 March 2006, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (201) 5 March
06’.
492