The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
792.
Sir Roderic
Lyne advised that Russia would vote in favour of a
second
resolution
in response to a “smoking gun”; but that it might support or
abstain
on a
resolution based on reports of non‑co‑operation.
793.
In a telegram
on 30 January, Sir Roderic Lyne advised that Russia was
“not
nearly as
steamed up about Iraq” as France and Germany.263
President
Putin’s
attitude
was “based on a pragmatic assessment of Russia’s interests – which
means
avoiding war
if possible, but more importantly not falling out with the
Americans and
avoiding
marginalisation at the UN”. Russia was “not talking veto language”
and
President
Putin’s remarks were beginning “to prepare public opinion for a
vote in favour
[of a
second resolution]”.
794.
Sir Roderic
wrote that Russia was “in the ‘most opposed’ group in the
Security
Council”
but Moscow was “not signalling real determination to make
difficulties or hold
out to the
end – rather the opposite”. The mood was “a mixture of pragmatism
and sullen
acquiescence
in a presumed outcome”.
795.
The evidence
for those conclusions set out by Sir Roderic
included:
•
The
official Russian line before the reports to the Security Council,
about the
need for
more time and that military action would not be justified, was
“ritualistic,
carefully
moderated and designed not to box Russia in (nor to whip up
public
emotions)”.
President Putin’s remarks in Kiev had “changed the tune
sharply”.
Mr Igor
Ivanov had “swung into line”.
•
President
Putin had told Mr Blair “two years ago that he would not
regret
the passing
of Saddam Hussein”, and he had not “pressed hard”
since
resolution 1441.
•
“THE
FRANCO‑RUSSIAN SYMPHONY” wasn’t playing: “Before 1441,
Chirac
and
Villepin were burning up the phone lines to Moscow, and Lavrov and
Levitte
[Mr Jean‑David
Levitte, French Permanent Representative to the UN] were
(for
a while) in
bed together in New York. It feels different this time.” That was
partly
because
“the Russians thought the French welshed on them in the 1441
end
game”. The
larger point was that President Putin knew that Iraq was the
“litmus
test” for
his strategic relationship with President Bush. President Putin’s
visit
to France
and Germany from 9‑11 February might “well create the
impression
of a
common front, but under the surface it isn’t so”.
•
“Almost no
one” in Russia wanted to see a war in Iraq. The “Russian
body
politic”
was “acutely uncomfortable with US hyperpower and Russian
impotence”
but there
was “less heat” about Iraq than “in France, Germany or
Western
Europe in
general”. No one was forecasting that President Putin would
“break
with the
Americans”.
263
Telegram 33
Moscow to FCO London, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Which Way Will Russia
Jump?’
142