4.2 | Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

733. The dossier made clear that Iraq would not be able to develop a nuclear weapon

without procuring key equipment and material, but stated:

• “Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons in breach of its

obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in breach of UNSCR 687.

Uranium has been sought from Africa that has no civil nuclear application

in Iraq.”405

• “… [T]here is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities

of uranium from Africa.”406

734. The FAC stated that the assertion in the September 2002 dossier should have

been qualified to “reflect the uncertainty” surrounding the evidence upon which it

was based.407

735. The ISC took evidence from Sir Richard Dearlove on SIS judgements on the

reliability of its “two independent sources” for reporting in June and September 2002.408

While the IAEA had called into question documentary evidence it had received in

February 2003 and SIS was still conducting further investigations, the ISC reported

that it had been told that this “did not affect” SIS’ judgement of its second source and

its belief that Iraq was “attempting to negotiate the purchase of uranium from Niger”.

The ISC described the SIS judgement as reasonable.

736. In its response to the FAC in November 2003, the FCO stated that: “the claim

in the September dossier rested on separate evidence to that judged fraudulent by

the IAEA”, and that this intelligence was still under review and had not been shared

with the CIA.409

737. The Butler Review concluded that the “intelligence was credible” that Iraq had

sought to purchase uranium ore from Niger in 1999.410

738. Iraqi officials had visited Niger in 1999 and further intelligence was received during

2002 which identified that the purpose of the visit had “been to negotiate the purchase

of uranium ore, although there was disagreement as to whether a sale had been agreed

and the uranium shipped”.411

405 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British Government, 24 September 2002,

page 17.

406 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British Government, 24 September 2002,

page 25.

407 Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002-2003, The Decision to go to War

in Iraq, HC 813-1.

408 Intelligence and Security Committee, Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and

Assessments, September 2003, Cm5972, paragraphs 89-93.

409 Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002-2003, The Decision to go to War in

Iraq, Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm6062.

410 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraph 503.

411 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraphs 493 and 495.

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