8 | The
invasion
conditions,
the Chiefs of Staff had “directed PJHQ to recover deployed
formations,
where
possible, before the summer”. It remained the UK’s strategic intent
“to draw down
to nearer a
medium scale of effort – a Div[isional] HQ and a B[riga]de – by
Autumn 03”,
sufficient
to run two provinces, but there was a clear US expectation that the
UK would
take
responsibility for up to two more provinces “as the Coalition
grows”.
626.
Lt Gen Reith
warned that, without a UN mandate and with few nations
able
to generate
forces quickly, the UK “should not plan on substantial early
Coalition
augmentation
of UK resources”. He also advised that the level of Iraqi consent
in the
South-East
was “assumed to be medium (patchy) turning to high as Phase IV
develops”,
but would
be kept under review. A brigade of four battlegroups would be
needed to
perform the
military tasks anticipated in the two provinces and to provide a
secure
environment
for other activities.
627.
The Inquiry
has seen no record of a meeting to discuss the UK AOR chaired
by
Mr Hoon
in the MOD on 14 April, but speaking notes for Mr Hoon’s
conversation with
Secretary
Rumsfeld were prepared on 14 April.
628.
In the
military Statement of Requirement (SOR) for a UK AOR, Lt Gen
Reith:
•
estimated
the force requirements for six provinces that might form part
of
the UK AOR,
all on the assumption that levels of consent would
continue
to
rise;
•
recommended
that the UK “should not assume responsibility for more
than two
provinces until additional and appropriate Coalition Forces
are
deployed.
This needs formal US/UK agreement”; and
•
advised that
the SOR might need to change, but was “a starting point
for
discussion
with potential troop contributing nations”.
629.
The SOR did
not directly address two issues raised in the Phase IV
planning
guidance
and the Concept of Operations with strategic implications for the
UK’s
commitment
in the South:
•
the risk
that low levels of consent might persist for some time in
certain
areas;
and
•
the scale
of the post-conflict task, in particular the steps, military
and
non‑military,
needed to secure high levels of Iraqi consent.
630.
Adm Boyce
concluded that “urgent clarification” of the potential
requirement
for the UK
to take responsibility for four provinces was needed.
111