9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
45.
A difference
between UK and US opinion on Maysan was discussed at the
Iraq
Strategy
Group on 30 June.39
The record
of the meeting said:
“We needed
to look again at how we presented our arguments – including
the
scope for
reminding the US of Maliki’s statement that Maysan would
transition
soon. Nick
highlighted the risk that if Dhi Qar went ahead of Maysan there
would
be a
requirement for additional UK forces. The meeting agreed that this
was not
acceptable,
and that we would need to push the US hard in the next few weeks
to
recognise
this and the force of our arguments over Maysan and the Iranian
border.”
46.
Vice Admiral
Charles Style, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments),
told
the Iraq
Strategy Group that appointing the new Basra security chief was
“critical to
seeing a
real difference” but even once that had happened “it would still
take 6‑9 months
to see a
significant change in the security situation”.40
47.
On 4 July,
Mr Browne wrote to Mr Blair to say that he intended to
agree with DOP(I)
a range of
projects to support a Better Basra Plan, costing £30.7m for the
remainder of
the
financial year, “a relatively small sum given the strategic
importance of Basra”.41
48.
The projects
would deliver:
•
a “new unit
to clean up the Basra police from within”;
•
on the spot
mentoring of the Basra police and the regional prison
managers;
•
a new unit
to fast‑track corruption, organised and major crime cases
through
Basra’s
courts;
•
more
training for judges; and
•
witness
protection arrangements.
49.
Overall, the
aim of the programme was to “increase the capacity of the
Iraqis
to deal
with those detained by the Iraqi Security Forces and so avoid the
legacy of
long‑term
detention of large numbers”. This work was intended to be combined
with
“energetic
implementation of the Basra Security Plan”. The projects on police
reform and
reconstruction
are considered in Sections 12.1 and 10.2.
39
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 30 June 2006, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group’.
40
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 30 June 2006, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group’.
41
Letter
Browne to Prime Minister, 4 July 2006 attaching Annex A ‘Background
on Additional Basra Work’.
11