The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
126.
Maj Gen
Shirreff also reported on 10 August that Maj Gen Hamadi had
been
appointed
as the security co‑ordinator for Basra and had been given
appropriate
authority
over the ISF. Maj Gen Shirreff considered that there were “two
key
prerequisites”
to success for Op SALAMANCA:
•
delivering
“a number of niche capabilities”, about which he had submitted
his
preliminary
analysis to PJHQ; and
•
getting
Iraqi policing and military buy‑in, which, in his view, was likely
to be the
more
difficult.
127.
Maj Gen
Shirreff wrote:
“Fundamental
to my concept is the variable application (depending on the
district
of the
City) of J3 (operations – kinetic if necessary), J7 (SSR) and J9
(the integration
of short,
medium and long term projects) to ensure that the people of Basra
perceive
that the
situation is getting better; very much the comprehensive approach.
My aim
is to
colour Basra green by district in order to get PIC.”
The House
of Commons Select Committee on Defence published a report on 10
August
that
focused on issues raised with Committee members by Service
Personnel when they
visited
Iraq in June 2006.91
The
principal areas of concern were the security situation
in
MND(SE) and
the continuing need for the deployment of UK Armed Forces;
shortcomings
in the
provision and suitability of equipment (see Section 14.1); and the
hardships and
inconveniences
endured by troops (see Section 16.1).
The
Committee recognised that the security situation in MND(SE) was
more benign than
elsewhere
in Iraq. Transition to PIC in Muthanna was a positive step although
the key
test would
be achieving the same in Basra, where there were “significant
obstacles”.
It
expressed concern at the recent increase in violence in the South
East due to local
political
struggles for power; and about the differing assessments that it
had been given
about the
extent to which IEDs were being smuggled into Iraq from
Iran.
The
Committee observed that Security Sector Reform (see Section 12.1)
would be crucial
to drawdown
and to the eventual withdrawal of UK troops from Iraq. There
remained
serious
challenges, especially with the Iraqi police. It also considered
that the future
stability
of Iraq would depend on reconstruction of the economy and suggested
that the
Government
should consider whether there should be an injection of additional
funding to
assist the
Basra Provincial Reconstruction Team.
The
Government’s response, issued in October 2006, emphasised that the
role of MNF,
including
UK, troops was to “hold the security ring” pending the development
of ISF
91
Thirteenth
Report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session
2005‑2006,
UK Operations
in Iraq, HC1241.
26