4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
264.
Addressing the
judgements that had been reached, Sir John Scarlett stated
that
it was “not
at all unusual for an intelligence base behind judgments to be
limited or
described
as sporadic and patchy”. The intelligence received in September
was:
“… judged
against a set of standing judgments from the past which I’d been at
pains
to point
out were already quite strong …”121
265.
Sir John
subsequently stated: “We thought there was a sound intelligence
base,
and we had
a firm judgment. That’s the point I want to make.”122
“The
discussion on 4 September at the JIC really was one that gelled
with the very
firm view
amongst the community about both the possession and the readiness
to
use, on
Saddam’s part, these weapons.
“We went
away, in the light of that discussion, and wrote the paper which is
the final
Assessment
and expressed those views really quite specifically and as very
firm
judgments
which did, I think, pin down the view of the JIC community at that
point.
It was the
moment which sticks with me as being quite an important one in
terms of
the arrival
of new intelligence, and the precipitation of a discussion in the
JIC which
led to a
very firm expression of the judgments it had reached on both
possession
and
intent.”
267.
In response to
a question about the categorical nature of the Key
Judgements
in
comparison with the detailed text in the 9 September Assessment,
Sir John Scarlett
emphasised
the importance of the distinction to be drawn between the strength
of the
intelligence
base on which an Assessment drew and the firmness of the JIC’s
Key
Judgements;
and that the JIC had, in September 2002, made “quite firm
judgements”
despite the
limitations in the intelligence.123
268.
Mr Miller
told the Inquiry that the document discussed by the JIC on 4
September:
“… wasn’t a
full JIC Assessment, and it was full of … caveated language
…
“In the
discussion, the point was made by one of the JIC members that at
this stage
we should,
as a Committee, be very clear on what we were telling Ministers,
and
there was a
view expressed in terms that, despite the caveats in the
document
prepared by
the Assessment Staff, the view was that Saddam did possess
the
weapons and
would be ready to use them, and that was the view that was
shared
around the
JIC table, and which the JIC specifically wanted set out in those
terms
as the
advice that Ministers should read from their intelligence
committee.
121
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, page 42.
122
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, page 43.
123
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, pages 85-86.
163