12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1344.
In addition,
smaller MiTTs would remain embedded with the Headquarters
of
10th Division.
1345.
The MOD said
that central to their re‑posturing plans would be the release
of
manpower to
better focus on training for the IPS, Iraqi Army and DBE,
concentrating
on the
weakest areas of leadership and collective training.
1346.
To help
Mr Blair draft a statement to Parliament on the latest
military plans, the
MOD
provided an update on Op SINBAD on 16
February.1240
The paper
described a
number of
areas where progress had been achieved:
•
Experience
of operations for the PJCC had improved the ISF’s ability to
plan
and
co‑ordinate operations in the city. The paper did say that “given
its central
importance
PJCC mentoring will continue beyond SINBAD and PIC”.
•
A reduction
in reported crime. There was no mention of concerns over
the
validity of
those figures.
•
An
improvement in basic police capability, although problems with
leadership
and
corruption were acknowledged and the paper later assessed that up
to
75 percent
of Basra IPS were members of a militia and “many” were linked
to
criminal
activity.
•
The Iraqi
Army had reached the level required for PIC but “their ability to
stand
up to
militias unaided by coalition remains questionable”.
1347.
On 21
February, Mr Blair delivered his statement in
Parliament:
“Since the
outset, our plan, agreed by the United Nations, has been to build
up Iraqi
capability
in order to let Iraqis take control of their own destiny, and that
as they
would step
up, we would increasingly step back. For three years therefore, we
have
been
working to create, train and equip Iraqi security forces capable of
taking on the
security of
the country themselves.
“In normal
circumstances, the progress would be considered remarkable.
There
are now 10
Divisions of the new Iraqi Army and more than 130,000 soldiers,
able in
significant
parts of the country to provide order. There are 135,000 personnel
in the
Iraqi
Police Service. There, the progress has been more constrained, and
frequently
hampered by
corruption and sectarianism, but none the less, again, in
normal
circumstances,
it would be considered a remarkable effort. The plan of
General
Petraeus …
which was conceived in 2004, has in its essential respects been
put
in place
…
“Over the
past months, we have been conducting an operation in Basra with
the
10th
Division of the Iraqi Army, to reach the stage where Basra can be
secured
by the
Iraqis themselves …
1240
Letter
Beadle to Banner, 16 February 2007, ‘The Effects of Op SINBAD
20 September 2006 to
14 January
2007’ attaching Paper ‘The Effect of Operation
SINBAD’.
367