9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
blurred. Al
Qaida in Iraq (AQ-I) is the most prominent jihadist group, with the
greatest
organisational
capacity …
“IV. There
are limited signs that a small number of Sunni insurgents are
considering
drawing
away from violence, at least against the MNF. An enduring theme
from them
is the need
to combat the activities of AQ-I and the Iranians. Coalition
outreach has
identified
some Sunni insurgent leaders willing to engage … The ability of
these
tentative
contacts to affect broader insurgent violence is
unknown.
“V. The
strength of the insurgency is in part affected by Sunni
participation in
the
political process … Much will depend on the actions of the new
government
in
addressing broader Sunni concerns: federalism, de-Ba’athification,
reform of
the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF), MNF withdrawal, security and detainees,
and
improvement
in the quality of life.
“VI. Many
insurgents have probably already decided that the political process
will
not give
them influence or benefit, or at least see no contradiction in
pursuing a
twin‑track
approach of political participation and violence. A hard core of
Sunni Arabs
will remain
irreconcilable and join the jihadists in rejecting the political
process. A
strong
Sunni Arab insurgency is likely to persist beyond
2006.”
722.
On 12 May, a
view of the situation in Basra was provided to Mr Tim Dowse,
Chief
of the
Assessments Staff.350
It
said:
“… the
general security situation in Basra is in steady, if generally
unspectacular,
decline …
There are now 8-10 assassination-style murders a day, usually of
Sunnis.
Religious,
criminal and politically motivated intimidation is prevalent … The
situation
is
aggravated by the growing heat resulting in armed demonstrations at
night against
the local
authorities complaining of lack of electricity and other services …
Political
life in
Basra revolves around money, patronage and intimidation … The
capacity
of local
militias to influence politics through a show or threat of force
was apparent
during the
December elections … The police and Iraqi army have shown no
appetite
to confront
JAM and their capability to do so is untested.”
723.
The brief
provided to Mr Dowse considered that the attacks on UK forces
in Basra
were being
conducted in part by elements of JAM and in part by renegade
elements
within the
Iraqi Security Forces:
“The
problem of renegade security forces requires an Iraqi solution that
depends on
tackling
corruption and militia penetration of the Iraqi Security Forces and
increasing
the
influence of the central government over the provincial government
in Basra.”
350
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East to
Dowse, 12 May 2006,
‘Situation
in Basrah’.
607