3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
“The
tragedy is that had such a resolution ensued and had the UN come
together
and united
– and if other troops had gone there, not just British and
American
troops –
Saddam Hussein might have complied. But the moment we proposed
the
benchmarks
and canvassed support for an ultimatum, there was immediate
recourse
to the
language of the veto. The choice was not action now or a
postponement of
action; the
choice was action or no action at all.”
910.
Asked what he
meant by an unreasonable veto, Mr Blair
responded:
“In
resolution 1441, we said that it was Saddam’s final opportunity and
that he had
to comply.
That was agreed by all members of the Security Council. What is
surely
unreasonable
is for a country to come forward now, at the very point when we
might
reach
agreement and when we are – not unreasonably – saying that he must
comply
with the
UN, after all these months … on the basis of six tests or action
will follow.
For that
country to say that it will veto such a resolution in all
circumstances is what
I would
call unreasonable.”
“The
tragedy is that the world has to learn the lesson all over again
that weakness
in the face
of a threat from a tyrant is the surest way not to peace but … to
conflict
… we have
been victims of our own desire to placate the implacable, to
persuade
towards
reason the utterly unreasonable, and to hope that there was some
genuine
intent to
do good in a regime whose mind is in fact evil.”
912.
In response to
a suggestion that the diplomatic process should be continued
for
a little
longer, Mr Blair responded:
“We could
have had more time if the compromise proposal that we put forward
had
been
accepted … unless the threat of action was made, it was unlikely
that Saddam
would meet
the tests.
“… the
problem with diplomacy was that it came to an end after the
position of
France was
made public – and repeated in a private conversation – and it said
it
would
block, by veto, any resolution that contained an ultimatum … the
French were
not
prepared to change their position. I am not prepared to carry on
waiting and
delaying,
with our troops in place in difficult circumstances, when that
country has
made it
clear it has a fixed position and will not change.”
913.
Questioned
whether it was he, not the French, Russians and Chinese, who
had
changed
position and about his statement – that the only circumstances in
which he
would go to
war without a second resolution was if the inspectors concluded
that there
had been no
more progress, which they had not; if there were a majority on the
Security
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