12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
Defence
Secretary or a Special Envoy, in order to reinforce the point that
this is
of high
importance to HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] and the Prime
Minister
1351.
In her report
dated 28 February (dealt with in more detail in Section
9.5),
Dr Marsden
wrote:
“While
polling suggests that the IPS inspire confidence in about 65
percent of
the
population … those questioned by British representatives said that
the police
could not
be trusted. Many told stories of intimidation and claimed
knowledge
of
kidnappings and death squads. Others said they would not call the
police
emergency
hotline to report criminal or terrorist activity for fear that
policemen taking
the calls
were in cahoots with the militias. Basrawis are willing to call the
police to
report
general crime but if criminals threatened them or their families,
they are more
likely to
turn to their tribe for help.”1244
1352.
The third
iteration of the Better Basra Plan, ‘Better Basra Mark III’, was
sent by
Dr Marsden
to Ms Aldred on 2 March.1245
It is
described more fully in Section 9.5.
1353.
It set out the
combined military and civilian strategic priorities for Basra for
the
coming six
months. One of the indicators of success would be “Iraqi Government
control
sustained
after PIC with no breakdown of law and order”. The plan had a
number of
subsections
including “security” and “Rule of Law”.
1354.
The “security”
aim was to “reduce the threat from illegal armed groups and
Iranian
proxies and
build the capacity of the Iraqi Army to take on militant JAM and
conduct
their own
Strike Operations”. The plan noted that, although the Iraqi Army
had grown in
confidence
during Op SINBAD, it would “certainly face stiffer tests in
future”. To enhance
capability
over the next six months the UK would:
•
deploy
MiTTs with 10th Division Iraqi Army units;
•
provide
further leadership training;
•
conduct
more joint operations;
•
establish
Iraqi ownership and a relationship of trust with the Basra
Emergency
Security
Committee (assuming the Iraqi Government wished to maintain it);
and
•
press the
IMOD and the US to provide more equipment (particularly
heavy
weapons) so
that 10th Division felt sufficiently equipped to engage
effectively.
1243
Letter
Fletcher to Siddiq, 26 February 2007, ‘Iraq: Basra’.
1244
Letter
Marsden to McDonald, 28 February 2007, ‘Basra: Everyday Life for
Ordinary Iraqis’.
1245
Letter
Marsden to Aldred, 2 March 2007, ‘Better Basra’ attaching Paper, 1
March 2007, ‘Better Basra
Mark 3: The
2007 Plan’.
369